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DEMOCRATIZING HMO REGULATION
TO ENFORCE THE "RULE OF RESCUE"
Kent G. Rutter*
Despite heightened public concern about HMOs, misguided regu-
latory measures have not guaranteed HMO patients access to the
treatment options many consider vital. This Note recommends
four changes to the current regulatory system that would preserve
HMOs' ability to control health care costs while allowing patients
and doctors, rather than lawmakers or HMO administrators, to
set health care priorities.
"Beware your HMO,"' the media have advised managed
health care patients,2 and patients are no doubt wary. They
have heard the HMO horror stories: A California woman died
of breast cancer after her HMO denied coverage for a bone
marrow transplant.3 Another HMO refused to provide a drug
needed to keep a patient's prostate cancer in check, insisting
instead on a more "cost effective" solution-surgery to remove
the man's testicles.4 A Florida man died of a heart attack in
his daughter's car outside an HMO clinic after the HMO
declined to hospitalize him.5 An HIV positive patient may
find that his HMO does not provide access to a specialist
with experience in treating HIV; as a consequence, he can
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform,
Volume 29, 1996. A.B. 1993, Duke University; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan
Law School. Associate, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P. I would like to thank Elizabeth
Peterson for her insightful comments and suggestions.
1. A Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) is an entity that, for a fixed
premium, covers health care services generally provided by HMO doctors or doctors
to whom employees are referred by the HMO. See 2 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAW § 11-11(a), at 53-54 (1995); see also infra Part I.
2. See Ellyn E. Spragins, Beware Your HMO, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1995, at 54;
see also Maggie Mahar, Time for a Checkup, BARRON'S, Mar. 4, 1996, at 29, 30 ("As if
smelling blood in the water, newspapers and magazines have turned from cheerful
if boring tales of HMOs' ability to contain costs to horror stories about patients who
requested a particular procedure, were turned down by HMO administrators, and
subsequently died.").
3. See Erik Eckholm, $89 Million Awarded Family Who Sued H.M.O., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at Al.
4. See Treatment Trouble, SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 1993, at 25A.
5. See Larry Keller & Fred Schulte, Grievance System Criticized, SUN-SENTINEL,
Nov. 10, 1993, at 1A.
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expect the virus to develop into symptomatic AIDS.6 News-
week has advised HMO enrollees: "If your employer offers an
old-fashioned fee-for-service indemnity plan, consider switch-
ing.
7
For several reasons, such advice has not yet halted the
rapid growth of HMOs. First, employers providing health
insurance favor the low cost of HMO care, and many no lon-
ger offer employees more expensive health care options.
8
Second, HMOs typically offer a generous array of those bene-
fits that a healthy employee may expect to utilize repeatedly
or in the short term, such as low-cost prescription medica-
tions and pediatric care.9 Young people in particular may
simply dismiss the unlikely prospect of a serious illness.1"
Finally, enrollees may speculate that even if the horror sto-
ries are true1 they are probably anomalies, not the typical
experience of a seriously ill HMO patient.
But the horror stories remind patients that at least occa-
sionally, managed care companies victimize their own
enrollees. The inference is not difficult: the same HMO that
eagerly provides cheap prescription drugs and brochures on
cardiovascular health may deny expensive but vital care to
its patients when they are sickest and most vulnerable. One
disgruntled subscriber complained: "'These HMOs are fine
6. See Lawrence K. Altman, Survival of AIDS Patients Linked to Experience of
Their Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1996, at A12; Elisabeth Rosenthal, Managed Care
Has Trouble Treating AIDS, Patients Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, at Al. The
same is true of other conditions, such as diabetes. Cf T.M. Hayes & J. Harries,
Randomised Controlled Trial of Routine Hospital Clinic Care Versus Routine
General Practice Care for Type H Diabetics, 289 BRIT. MED. J. 728, 729-30 (1984).
7. Spragins, supra note 2, at 56.
8. See GUY M. MASTERS ET AL., HEALTH CARE CAPITATION AND RISK CONTRACTING
MANUAL §§ 130, 1100 (1995). But cf BERNARD D. HIRSH & DONALD P. WILCOX, THE LAW
OF MANAGED CARE 7-8 (1994) (noting consulting firm's findings that employers in the
Houston, Texas, area pay more on average for HMO coverage than for fee-for-
service coverage, perhaps because of "richer benefits" or lower deductibles).
9. See Nancy J. Perry, A Report Card on HMOs, FORTUNE, June 28, 1993, at
110.
10. See Martin Gottlieb, Picking a Health Plan: A Shot in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1996, § 3, at 9 (noting that because young people "are less concerned about
getting sick" they evaluate health care plans based on cost, not the providers'
reputation for quality); Perry, supra note 9, at 112 (reporting that young people are
most likely to join HMOs).
11. See Mahar, supra note 2, at 30 ("The tales tend to be just a little fuzzy
about whether the patient died because he was denied treatment, but then one
doesn't read horror stories for their tight causal connections.").
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for the average person who is not sick. The minute they get
ill, [HMOs] look for ways to cut corners.' ,12
In short, participation in HMOs has increased 3 at the
same time that public confidence in HMO care for the seri-
ously ill has been badly shaken. This widespread concern has
fueled extensive efforts to regulate HMOs at both the state
and federal levels.' 4 HMO regulation has attempted to re-
spond to the need for comprehensive coverage of routine and
low-cost treatments, as well as coverage of less frequent but
more expensive care. This Note contends that existing regula-
tion of private HMOs does not adequately reconcile these
demands with the public policy of containing national health
care expenditures. 5
Part I of this Note defines an HMO as a managed care entity,
acting as both insurer and health care provider, that employs
certain cost-containment techniques within the bounds of a
customized regulatory framework. Part II examines widely held
convictions about medical care, including the "Rule of Rescue,"
and identifies compatible cost-reducing HMO behaviors that
ideal HMO regulations should encourage. Part III provides a
brief critical overview of existing regulatory mechanisms,
including federal and state legislation and common law rules.
Finally, in Part IV this Note sets forth four principles for
improved state legislation. First, state legislatures should
prohibit HMOs from using systems of physician bonuses and
penalties that are likely to induce drastic reductions in pa-
tient care. Second, HMOs should be required to disclose
physician incentives to patients. Third, HMO patients who
believe that they have been wrongly denied health care
should be guaranteed access to quick, informal, and binding
12. Treatment Trouble, supra note 4, at 25A.
13. See 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 8.1, at 478 (1995).
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. Many of the principles raised in this Note are at least partially applicable
to other forms of managed care, including HMOs serving Medicare and Medicaid
clients. Recipients of Medicare and Medicaid benefits who enroll in HMOs enjoy
federal protections currently unavailable to patients in the private market, includ-
ing access to an extrajudicial appeals process and enhanced grievance-resolution
procedures. In practice, however, the protections afforded by these mechanisms may
be more illusory than genuine. See Susan J. Stayn, Note, Securing Access to Care in
Health Maintenance Organizations: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and
Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1674, 1690-1701 (1994). A full discussion of
how these principles could be applied outside of the private HMO market, however,
is beyond the scope of this Note.
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dispute resolution procedures. Finally, three common types of
state legislation that restrict HMOs, increase costs, and do
little to improve patient care should be repealed. Together,
these reforms would yield cost-effective care better reflecting
the priorities of patients rather than health care administra-
tors or regulators.
I. THE HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION
Alarmed by rising health care costs, 16 government regula-
tors and actors in the private health care market have
steered patients away from traditional health insurance
plans and toward managed care. Both traditional plans and
HMOs provide insurance: enrollees or their employers pay a
premium that remains "fixed without regard to the frequen-
cy, extent, or kind of health service .. .actually furnished."' 7
In return, conventional "fee-for-service" plans reimburse their
patients for medical services provided by independent doctors
and hospitals chosen by the patient. In contrast, an HMO
enrollee must use "networks" of providers affiliated with the
HMO as either employees or independent contractors.' 8 A
typical HMO provider network includes primary-care physi-
cians, medical specialists, nurses, hospitals, laboratories, and
clinics.' 9 Except in emergencies or where specific referral
procedures are followed, the enrollee must pay for any care
obtained from sources outside the network.2" Thus, an HMO
is both an insurer and a provider of medical services.2'
This dual role underlies the attractiveness of the HMO
concept. As an insurer, an HMO has an incentive to hold
16. Health care expenditures rose from about 7.6% of the nation's gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in 1973, to 10.6% of the GDP in 1983, and 13.9% of the GDP in
1993. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 109 (115th ed. 1995).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1)(B) (1994) (describing the basic health care payment
system under the federal statute). See generally ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 9-15 (1987) (explaining that an insured pays an insurer an agreed
sum to "assume a risk" by accepting responsibility for uncertain future expenses).
18. See 2 FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, § 11-11(a), at 54.
19. See Barbara A. Shickish, Legal Characteristics of the Health Maintenance
Organization, in HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW 1066 (Anne M. Dellinger ed., 1991).
20. See 2 FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, § 11-12, at 60 (distinguishing HMOs from
preferred provider organizations on this basis).
21. See id. § 11-11(a), at 53-54.
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down its health care expenditures; as a provider it has the
ability to do so. Regulators have acknowledged the potential
rewards of combining these roles in one entity, noting that
the HMO "provides a mechanism to analyze costs, expenses
and utilization of services, and affords a means to implement
measures to enhance efficiency."22 Although the implementa-
tion of these measures varies somewhat, all HMOs employ
some form of the same four cost-reduction techniques:23 pro-
vider selection,24 controlled access to specialists,25 physician
financial incentives," and utilization review.27
Together, these four practices reduce HMO expenditures by
imposing heightened cost awareness at each stage of the care
process. Generally, this process begins when an HMO enrollee
complains of symptoms to her primary-care physician.28 The
22. HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT § 1 introductory cmt. (National Ass'n of
Ins. Comm'rs 1991).
23. See Joan B. Trauner & Sibyl Tilson, Utilization Management and Quality
Assurance in Health Maintenance Organizations: An Operational Assessment, in
COMM EE ON UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT BY THIRD PARTIES, INSTITUTE OF MED., CONTROL-
LING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE? THE ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 205
app. B at 215-16 (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field eds., 1989) [hereinafter
CONTROLLING COSTS] (identifying four basic cost-reduction techniques); 1 FURROW ET AL.,
supra note 13, § 8-1, at 480.
24. An HMO includes in its network of eligible providers only those it believes
to be cost-effective. See 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 13, § 8-1, at 480.
25. With certain exceptions (emergencies, for example), an HMO will pay only
for care either provided by a network primary care physician or approved by one.
Thus, these general practice doctors serve as "gatekeepers" who must pre-approve a
patient's visit to a more expensive medical specialist. See id.
26. Through bonuses, penalties, and withholding mechanisms, most HMOs
financially reward network physicians who stay within pre-set spending goals by
limiting their patients' access to treatments, medical specialists, and inpatient
hospital care. See id.
27. Like all health care plans, HMOs review physicians' decisions to order care,
and pay only for care found to be necessary and appropriate. While review by a fee-
for-service insurer is retrospective, HMOs frequently review physicians' decisions
before the care is administered. See Ruth Simon, A Flawed Remedy: Managed Care,
MONEY, Apr. 1, 1993, at 114, 119.
28. Alternatively, a patient may appear at a hospital emergency room. Every
HMO will pay for "emergency" care received outside its provider network. Emergency
room doctors, however, know that an HMO patient may face an expensive bill if the
HMO determines that the situation was not an actual "emergency." Consequently,
they feel pressure to delay treatment, where possible, until an HMO patient's primary
care physician can be contacted for approval. See Susan Brink, How Your HMO Could
Hurt You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 62, 64. Some states have
proposed or enacted legislation to circumvent this problem. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 10-16-407(2) (1994) ([A] 'life or limb threatening emergency' means any event which
the enrollee believes threatens his or her life or limb in such a manner that a need
for immediate medical care is created to prevent death or serious impairment of
health."); Stayn, supra note 15, at 1718-19 (approving the Colorado statute and the
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patient's complaints or a physical examination may yield an
obvious diagnosis suggesting a clear course of treatment.2 9
More often, however, physicians must make judgment calls
because the diagnosis is uncertain, the effectiveness of a
possible treatment is unproven, the best treatment option
among available alternatives is a matter of opinion, or the
patient exhibits a strong preference for one treatment option
over others.3 ° In these cases, the physician must exercise her
discretion. Should she perform diagnostic tests, prescribe
medication, or perform a procedure herself? Should she hospi-
talize the patient, or perhaps refer him to a medical specialist
for further evaluation and treatment?
As she reflects on these questions, an HMO physician may
weigh a number of considerations. Naturally, as a physician
she has an ethical duty to her patient,31 reinforced by concern
for her reputation and the constant peril of malpractice liabil-
ity.3 2 At the same time, she may sacrifice a bonus or suffer a
financial penalty if she exceeds spending targets, hospitalizes
a patient, or refers a patient to a medical specialist.33 The
primary care physician whose contract prohibits certain
referrals faces a more limited choice: she must either deny care
that under conventional insurance would have been provided
by a medical specialist such as a surgeon, or attempt to per-
form the procedure herself.34
definition of "emergency services" included in the laws of Maryland and Texas);
Michael A. Stocker, The Ticket to Better Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995,
at 21 (opinion of president and chief executive officer of Empire Blue Cross/Blue
Shield, endorsing similar legislation in New York).
29. See DAVID MECHANIC, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 95-99 (2d ed. 1978).
30. See id.
31. See Nathan T. Sidley, Medical and Professional Ethics, in LAW AND ETHICS
383-409 (Nathan T. Sidley ed., 1985).
32. See PATRICIA M. DANzON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 146-49 (1985); Carol S. Weisman et al., Practice Changes in Response to the
Malpractice Litigation Climate: Results of a Maryland Physician Survey, 27 MED. CARE
16, 17 (1989).
33. See HIRSH & WILCOX, supra note 8, at 59.
34. See Karen Cheney, What You Can Learn from an M.D. Mutiny in a Managed-
Care Plan, MONEY, Dec. 1995, at 21, 21. Primary care doctors are naturally reluctant
to provide specialized care without adequate training. In Tucson, Arizona, for example,
one-half of the 100 primary care physicians affiliated with Intergroup of Arizona
decided to leave the plan in 1995 rather than sign a revised contract requiring them
to perform specialized procedures such as resetting dislocated shoulders and perform-
ing tracheotomies. Said one physician: "Don't get me wrong. I'd attempt a tracheotomy
if the patient was stuck at the bottom of the Grand Canyon.... But in Tucson, it's
not as if we don't have access to surgeons." Id.
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Apart from these concerns, an HMO physician may worry
that her treatment decisions will jeopardize her practice. A
typical contract between a doctor and an HMO requires annual
renewal, and at that time the HMO may drop from its network
a physician it perceives not to be cost effective.35 Although
contract cancellations are rare, they do deter renegade physi-
cians because doctors who primarily serve HMO enrollees can
ill afford this consequence of a liberal practice style.36 In
making care decisions an HMO doctor may well adopt the
approach suggested by one provider: "You just don't risk
making these people angry."
37
An HMO physician moved despite these concerns to prescribe
abundant care knows that this decision is not hers alone. As
part of "utilization review," the typical HMO requires a physi-
cian or enrollee to obtain its permission before ordering hospi-
talization or an expensive outpatient procedure. 38 When a
doctor requests permission for such treatments, a computer
program scans the requests for features that trigger review by
a nurse,39 who in turn designates a few of these requests for
physician analysis.4" The HMO's reviewing physician41 may
grant the request, override it, or attempt to compromise with
the requesting physician by suggesting a less expensive course
of treatment.42 Reviewing physicians often question inpatient
procedures, and some plans report up to forty percent fewer
hospitalizations.43
35. See MASTERS ET AL., supra note 8, § 1132.7; see also Erik Larson, The Soul of
an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 44, 50 (describing the physician contract used by
Health Net, a major HMO, which requires annual renewal).
36. See HIRSH & WILCOX, supra note 8, at 35 (alleging that doctors "are obliged to
compete with each other in denying medically indicated or preferred modes of patient
treatment on the basis of cost, and only those physicians who are shown by the
computer to deny the most care survive"); Larson, supra note 35, at 50.
37. Brink, supra note 28, at 64; see also Bob Herbert, Torture by HMO, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at A29 (relating experience of physicians advised by colleagues
to "wise up to 'the new medical-economic reality'" and "not to push the H.M.O. too far"
before contract renewal).
38. CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 23, at 3, 17-18, 66. This aspect of affiliation
with an HMO stirs considerable resentment among physicians. See, e.g., Kevin
Grumbach & Thomas Bodenheimer, Mechanisms for Controlling Costs, 273 JAMA
1223, 1227 (1995) (noting that utilization review has "come under fire as a process
of micromanagement that intrudes into the physician-patient relationship and places
an unwelcome administrative hassle on physicians and other caregivers").
39. See CONTROLLING COSTS, supra note 23, at 71-73.
40. See id. at 73-77.
41. An HMO may employ its own personnel to perform utilization review, or it
may contract with an outside review firm or non-network physicians. See id. at 74-75.
42. See id. at 73-78.
43. See BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING
AccouNTABariy OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS 298-302 (1991) (summarizing the effects of
FALL 19961
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While the mechanics of these procedures are clear, their net
effect on HMO medicine is controversial. HMOs maintain that
their plans reduce health care costs by cutting waste and by
avoiding serious illness through an emphasis on preventative
care." Critics charge, however, that as applied by many HMOs,
these cost-reducing techniques not only eliminate waste but
also deny patients the "medically necessary" treatment that
HMOs are obligated to provide." The regulatory system has
responded to this criticism by adopting several strategies to
compel the provision of necessary care while allowing HMOs
to refuse to fund wasteful medicine.
II. DISTINGUISHING "WASTE" FROM
GOOD MEDICINE: REGULATORY GOALS
HMO providers and administrators make daily decisions to
provide or deny access to medical care. In doing so, these
decisionmakers operate within various regulatory constraints.
Successful regulations will be targeted carefully to deter an
HMO from denying those treatments it ought to provide.
Overintrusive regulations, in contrast, will impede even proper
denials and thereby limit an HMO's power to prevent waste.
The law regulating HMO care decisions should distinguish
essential services from wasteful ones.
A. Overtreatment: Ineffective and Unwanted Care
In some instances, HMOs have identified and reduced
needless expenditures without diminishing the quality of
patient care. For example, HMOs have negotiated reductions
utilization management programs on hospital admissions). Other studies show less
drastic effects and suggest that the amounts saved may not be attributable solely to
utilization management programs. See Howard L. Bailit & Cary Sennett, Utilization
Management as a Cost-Containment Strategy, HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV., 1991 Ann.
Supp., at 87, 87-88; T.M. Wickizer, The Effect of Utilization Review on Hospital Use
and Expenditures: A Review of the Literature and an Update on Recent Findings, 47
MED. CARE REV. 327, 351, 353, 358 (1990).
44. See DAVID MECHANIC, THE GROWTH OF BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE 85-97 (1976); see
also Simon, supra note 27, at 122 ("Managed-care firms argue that, since they target
only 'wasteful' spending, they do not imperil the quality of care.").
45. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 6, at Al; Spragins, supra note 2, at 54; Stayn,
supra note 15, at 1685-90.
154
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in the steep markups on certain cancer drugs.4" HMOs have
also worked to discourage medicine that is undesirable at any
cost-care that provides no benefit the patient desires. By all
accounts, overtreatment is widespread. A widely cited set of
studies examining the use of three medical procedures found
that doctors inappropriately prescribed these procedures one-
sixth to one-third of the time.47 Other estimates support these
claims, finding that ten to thirty percent of all medical treat-
ments are inappropriate.4" Thus, certain reductions in care may
not only be tolerable, but desirable.49 Researchers have con-
cluded: "The balance of the evidence currently suggests that
increasing the intensity of medical care does not inexorably
lead to improved outcomes. Any benefit accruing from more
intense medical care may be offset by harm."5 °
Why do doctors overtreat their patients? One explanation
places the blame on the unrealistic expectations of the patients
themselves. More than half of the patients who present symp-
toms to a physician are said to be "'worried well,' people with
no diagnosable disorder."51 These patients may expect medical
intervention regardless of whether it is warranted, and "doctors
must be sorely tempted to treat what seem to be imaginary
diseases with imaginary remedies." 52 A similar temptation
arises where a patient demanding intervention has a serious
but untreatable condition. A disappointed patient or family
may blame a doctor who refuses to pursue every conceivable
46. See, e.g., Bill Alpert, Painful Profit: Cancer-Treatment Firms May Soon See
Their Plump Margins Slashed, BARRON'S, Feb. 26, 1996, at 20, 20-21.
47. See Mark P. Chassin et al., Does Inappropriate Use Explain Geographic
Variations in the Use of Health Care Services ?A Study of Three Procedures, 258 JAMA
2533, 2536 (1987) (discussing the results of a study examining the appropriateness
of physicians performing coronary angiography, carotid endarterectomy, and upper
gastrointestinal tract endoscopy in certain elderly Medicare populations); Peter Franks
et al., Gatekeeping Revisited-Protecting Patients from Overtreatment, 327 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 424, 425 (1992); Rolla Edward Park et al., Physician Ratings of Appropriate
Indications for Three Procedures: Theoretical Indications vs. Indications Used in
Practice, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 445, 447 (1989).
48. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON EDUC. AND HEALTH, JOINT ECON. COMM., 101st
CONG., MEDICAL ALERT,. A STAFF REPORT SUMMARmNG THE HEARINGS ON 'THE FUTURE OF
HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA" 3, 31 (Joint Comm. Print 1989); Albert L. Siu et al.,
Inappropriate Use of Hospitals in a Randomized Trial of Health Insurance Plans, 315
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1261-64 (1986).
49. See MASTERS ET AL., supra note 8, § 901 (discussing and rejecting "the belief
that the more one spends, the more quality one receives").
50. Franks et al., supra note 47, at 427.
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option. Thus, a physician may be wary that a malpractice claim
will result if she refuses last-ditch efforts even if those efforts
are virtually certain to fail.53 Another explanation for
overtreatment observes that physicians' practice styles are
often related to their financial incentives: physicians who are
reimbursed for almost any service provided, as under a tradi-
tional fee-for-service plan, tend to pursue more aggressive
interventions.
4
Both inside and outside managed care, physicians have been
urged to resist these twin pressures and to order treatment
only where the expectation of benefit to the patient is realis-
tic.55 However, a desire to provide the extensive care a patient
demands, and the ability to profit by doing so often combine to
sway a physician's judgment, leading her to "follow the axiom
of 'when in doubt, do more.' ,,56 A study of in vitro fertilization
clinics, for example, found that clinics primarily serving women
in fee-for-service plans may realize a $3000 profit on each
$11,000 "cycle," or surgical fertilization attempt.5" Some clinics
encouraged women who did not initially become pregnant to
undergo additional cycles, and couples eager to conceive a child
rarely questioned this approach. These clinics often did not
inform patients that, especially in the case of older women,
subsequent attempts rarely succeed where initial cycles have
failed.5 9 In contrast, where an HMO provided the fertilization
services, women were less likely to undertake additional
ineffective surgeries because doctors were more likely to tell
53. See DANZON, supra note 32, at 146-49; Weisman et al., supra note 32, at 17.
54. See WILLIAM A GLASE, PAYING THE DocoR SYSTEMS OF REMUNERATION AND THEIR
EFFECTS 139-45 (1970); see also Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of
Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice-A Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiolo-
gist-Referring Physicians, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1604, 1604-06 (1990) (finding that
physicians with a financial interest in performing certain tests recommend them more
often).
55. See David M. Eddy, Principles for Making Difficult Decisions in Difficult
Times, 271 JAMA 1792, 1796 (1994) (calling on physicians to refrain from ordering
a treatment if it merely " 'might be beneficial,' if it provides 'any hope of benefit,' if
it is 'all we have to offer,' or if it is 'the patient's only hope,'" and urging that
physicians "do [their] best to determine that there actually is benefit, and .. . [to]
estimate the magnitude of the benefit").
56. Donald R. Cohodes, The Loss of Innocence: Health Care Under Siege, in HEALTH
CARE AND ITS COSTS 64, 70 (Carl J. Schramm ed., 1987).
57. See Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope's Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.




their patients when to give up."° As a result, the women in
HMOs were about as likely to become pregnant as their fee-for-
service counterparts although HMOs spent about half as much
per pregnancy.6 '
Other services may be certain to "work" from a medical
viewpoint but are nevertheless wasteful overtreatment because
the results are undesirable to the patient. This aspect of
overtreatment frequently arises in the context of expensive
technology-intensive treatments that can extend the lives of
patients near death. Although doctors tend to favor such
technology,62 patients' increased interest in living wills and
medical powers of attorney suggest that few patients would
choose aggressive medical interventions that prolong life but
do not improve it. 3 Because of incentives to reduce costs,
managed care providers are naturally disinclined to provide
these or other expensive treatments to patients who do not
want them. 4
B. HMOs and Rationing
A second variety of "waste" encompasses treatments whose
costs clearly exceed their benefits. HMOs insist that in making
decisions to provide or deny health care, they assess only
medical criteria and not financial considerations. Thus, their
contracts with enrollees typically ignore matters of cost and
promise that the HMO will provide any treatment that is
"medically necessary."6 5 This language appears consistent with
assertions by HMO representatives that HMOs reduce
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See John E. Wennberg, Outcomes Research, Cost Containment, and the Fear
of Health Care Rationing, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1203 (1990) (noting that doctors
are generally more aggressive, and patients more risk-averse, in selecting treatments).
63. See Linda L. Emanuel et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care-A Case
for Greater Use, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 889, 891 (1991); Wennberg, supra note 62, at
1203.
64. Of course, managed care providers may also be disinclined to provide these
expensive treatments to patients who do want them. See infra Part II.C (explaining
why some patients may desperately want such treatments); see also infra Part IV
(suggesting how the law could better facilitate treatment decisions that respect
patients' individual desires to receive or avoid particular types of care).
65. See HIRSH & WILCOX, supra note 8, at 12.
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expenditures "not by rationing but by coordinating better
care"66 and "target[ing] only 'wasteful' spending.
", 7
Despite these assertions, however, the concept of rationing
is implicit in promises to cut waste. Most people understand
that HMOs actually do factor cost into treatment decisions, and
indeed expect them to do so.6" Thus, although the urgency of
the health care "crisis" is open to debate, 69 many Americans
agree that some of the cost-reduction measures introduced by
managed care should be accepted, or at least tolerated.7 °
66. Karen Ignagni, Letter to the Editor, H.M.O.'s Insure Access to Transplants,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at A18 (explaining the American Association of Health
Plans' position that HMOs reduce costs by increasing efficiency).
67. Simon, supra note 27, at 114, 122.
68. See id. at 117 (citing a poll in which 72% of respondents supported reform of
the traditional fee-for-service health insurance system); Stuart Auerbach, Managed
Care Backlash, WASH. POST, June 25, 1996, at 12 (discussing finding by Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation Analysts that only 28% of Americans disapprove of the trend
toward managed care). But see KARLYN H. BOWMAN, PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON HEALTH CARE
REFORM: ARE THE POLLS MISLEADING THE POLICY MAKERS? 1-29 (1994) (reviewing several
types of polls and survey questions and suggesting that they are meaningless as a
guide to policymakers because the public is often ill-informed about the details and
consequences of reform, resulting in uncertainty about what Americans really believe
or want).
69. For a statement of the prevailing view, see Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective
Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to Accept Health Care Rationing
Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1755-56 (1992). Professor Havighurst writes:
"Until the nation finds ways to curb the health care sector's propensity to squander
substantial resources-perhaps whole percentage points of GNP-on low-priority
services, it will continue to neglect such needs as improved education and job-creating
capital investment." Id. Professor Stephen Utz counters, however, that it is incorrect
to assume
that if paying for health consumes an ever greater fraction of the gross domestic
product, society as a whole is less well off, just as a household suffers if its
health costs steadily rise .... Money spent on health care does not go up in
smoke. It goes to pay health care providers' salaries and provide profits for
investors in health care and insurance firms. The salaries and profits are spent
or saved in this country....
Accordingly, the significance of accelerating health care costs is not as
straightforward as many members of the public assume. If health care cost
increases are slowed, the result will be, in part, not just to stanch waste but also
to curtail a growing industry that has fewer externalities than others that may
replace it.
Stephen Utz, Federalism in Health Care: Costs and Benefits, 28 CONN. L. REV. 127,
131 (1995); see also Charles R. Morris, 'Runaway' Health Care Spending? It's the
Engine of New U.S. Economy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at M2 (arguing that the U.S.
will benefit from health care spending and predicting that the size of this "high
productivity, good-wage, rapid-growth, high-technology industry" will double before
leveling off).
70. See Auerbach, supra note 68, at 13; cf Simon, supra note 27, at 117.
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Consider, for example, a recently developed fluid used by
doctors to take internal X-rays. Like the substances used
conventionally, the new fluid is administered to patients by
injection and makes their blood vessels and some internal
organs more visible on the X-rays.' Although this new fluid
reduces the risk of fatal allergic reaction from one in 30,000 to
one in 250,000, entirely replacing the old fluid with the new
one would cost an additional $1 billion annually.
7 2
If an HMO refuses to pay for the new X-ray solution, oppo-
nents of managed care would doubtless decry the decision as
"rationing" while advocates might praise the same policy as
"cutting waste." In a sense, the rhetoric of each side is accu-
rate. An HMO that decides limited resources should not be
spent to avoid a minimal risk is by definition "rationing." At
the same time, such a treatment may fairly be labeled
"wasteful" although it provides some benefit because the money
spent to provide the marginally beneficial treatment could
better be used to fund higher-priority medicine.73 In other
words, "wasteful" treatments are not just those that are
ineffective or unwanted; from a global perspective a treatment
is "wasteful" if it consumes health care resources disproportion-
ate to the benefits it provides."
C. Cost-Based Denials and the "Rule of Rescue"
The American public does not distrust HMOs merely because
they refuse to turn a blind eye to matters of cost; surely, few
people would be outraged if their managed care plans refused
to provide the new billion-dollar X-ray fluid. Rather, patients
have lost faith in HMOs because a myopic fixation on cost has
led HMOs to deny truly essential services. If the HMO industry
is to survive attacks from a suspicious public, employers who
71. See Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules:
Promises, Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1559 (1992) (citing
Annetta Miller et al., Can You Afford to Get Sick?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1989, at 44,
47).
72. See id. at 1559.
73. See id. at 1545, 1561 (noting that in the managed care debate, the term
'waste" has become a "conceptual hodgepodge" commonly applied to ineffective and
unwanted treatments, but also to desirable procedures that are not "allocationally
efficient").
74. See id. at 1559-61.
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are increasingly sensitive to employees' health care concerns,75
and increasingly hostile legislatures, it must reform.76 Where
a bone marrow transplant has a realistic chance of success, and
it promises the results for which the patient and her family
desperately hope, an HMO must not find excuses to deny the
treatment because it is not ready to spend the money.77 The
cost-containment devices used by HMOs must never exert such
influence that providers will refuse to hospitalize patients
showing signs of imminent cardiac arrest.78 Enrollees who are
HIV positive must be provided with knowledgeable specialists
who can extend and improve their lives.79 In short, action is
needed to reassure patients that their HMOs will care for them
when they need care most. The indignation inspired by the
HMO horror stories" reveals that despite the high costs of
medical care, people will not accept suffering or death where
they are reasonably preventable.
This universal conviction can be traced to a well-established
psychological and moral phenomenon that ethicist Albert
Jonsen has dubbed the "Rule of Rescue."8 ' As Jonsen describes
it:
Our moral response to the imminence of death demands
that we rescue the doomed. We throw a rope to the
drowning, rush into burning buildings to snatch the en-
trapped, dispatch teams to search for the snowbound. This
rescue morality spills over into medical care, where our
ropes are artificial hearts, our rush is the mobile critical
care unit, our teams the transplant services. The imperative
75. See Arthur L. Dolinsky & Richard K. Caputo, An Assessment of Employers'
Experiences with HMOs: Factors that Make a Difference, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV.,
Winter 1991, at 25, 26 (explaining employers' concerns regarding health care quality
and their typical means of assessing the quality of services); Mahar, supra note 2, at
30 (describing the pressure large companies are imposing on HMOs to improve the
quality of their services).
76. See David C. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effective-
ness Meets the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2219 (1991) (observing that "any plan
to distribute health care services must take human nature into account if the plan
is to be acceptable to society").
77. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
79. See sources cited supra note 6.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
81. Albert R. Jonsen, Bentham in a Box: Technology Assessment and Health Care
Allocation, 14 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 172, 174 (1986) (explaining the Rule of
Rescue as an inherently anti-utilitarian, deontological principle, and asking, "How
should law deal with this powerful moral imperative?").
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to rescue is, undoubtedly, of great moral significance; but
the imperative seems to grow into a compulsion, more
instinctive than rational.8 2
Not surprisingly, the Rule of Rescue also underlies attitudes
toward managed health care when it is one's own life that may
need rescuing. Moreover, although the command of the Rule
of Rescue is most authoritative in matters of life and death, it
is also compelling whenever an identified human being can be
saved from pain or disability."
The Rule of Rescue plays an essential role in our evaluations
of medical intervention, despite the strange results obtained
by Oregon researchers who attempted to assemble a cost-
sensitive ranking of essential health care services. The re-
searchers relied on the results of a public survey to determine
how services to Oregon Medicaid recipients should be rationed,
but the list of ranked services was largely abandoned because
it 'did not comprehensively reflect public values."'8 4 To some
observers, the list demonstrated the public's willingness to
disregard the Rule of Rescue. 5 Indeed, the final list appeared
to be a shocking confirmation of this assessment: straightening
of crooked teeth, for example, ranked higher than treatments
for Hodgkin's disease. 6
The Oregon results, however, are probably attributable to the
methodology'of the study, not actual patient preferences. In the
poll, respondents were asked to prioritize health benefits, and
their priorities were then adjusted for the costs of providing
those benefits. For example, suppose that respondents said that
a particular service was one percent as vital as a certain
treatment with the potential to save lives. If the first service
costs $100 while the lifesaving treatment costs $11,000, the
low-cost treatment would be assigned a higher priority.7 The
patients' actual responses probably reveal nothing more than
82. Id. at 174.
83. See Hadorn, supra note 76, at 2219.
84. Caitlin J. Halligan, Note, "Just What the Doctor Ordered": Oregon's Medicaid
Rationing Process and Public Participation in Risk Regulation, 83 GEO. L.J. 2697, 2713
(1995) (quoting OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES: A
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 11 (1991)).
85. See id. at 2719.
86. See id. at 2712 (citing Daniel M. Fox & Howard Leichter, Rationing Care in
Oregon: The New Accountability, in FIVE STATES THAT COULD NOT WAIT 156 (Daniel M.
Fox & John K. Iglehart eds., 1994)).
87. See id. at 2705-11; see also Hadorn, supra note 76, at 2218-19.
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the difficulty of deriving precise ratios when comparing
fundamentally different medical services. A truer lesson from
the Oregon experiment may be that the almost universal
rejection of the adjusted results demonstrates that the Rule of
Rescue exerts a powerful hold even on those determined to find
a rational means for allocating health care resources.
Health care planners have reason to be wary of the Rule of
Rescue. The Rule is an imperfect moral compass because it
includes "an emotional component ... that can interfere with
the development and implementation of fair allocation sys-
tems."8 Because of this component, the effects of the Rule are
most pronounced when three criteria-each standing in sharp
contrast to pure need-are present.89 First, the circumstances
must be unusual enough to be seen as a crisis, and not merely
an unfortunate, ongoing problem. Second, the Rule of Rescue
is strongest where it is easy to identify with the potential
victim. Finally, this identification is most likely in incidents
with high symbolic value. Thus, "[a] prototypical example is a
child who falls down a well," yet "we do not apply the rule of
rescue to a homeless man dying of pneumonia over a steam
grate. "
Despite our troubling failure to apply the Rule of Rescue in
certain cases, the impulse is deeply rooted in the human
conscience and we resist attempts to disable the Rule of Rescue
principle altogether. Perhaps we should not try to avoid the
Rule of Rescue; it "might be seen as facilitating a sense of
fairness in providing for the needs of others-a sense that
might be poorly developed otherwise."9 As another commenta-
tor perceives the Rule, it "affirm[s] the value of life and the
commitment of the community to individuals in distress."92
Because the Rule of Rescue plays a central role in patients'
value systems, HMOs must heed the Rule and consistently
provide expensive but much-needed services. At the same time,
the Rule should not defeat attempts to deny wasteful care.93
Fortunately for managed care systems, which often must make
88. Hadorn, supra note 76, at 2219.
89. See Eddy, supra note 55, at 1796.
90. Id.
91. Hadorn, supra note 76, at 2219.
92. David Mechanic, Professional Judgment and the Rationing of Medical Care,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1713, 1753 (1992).
93. See Hadorn, supra note 76, at 2219-20 (noting that the Rule of Rescue, if
always followed, "would lead to an impossibly expensive system").
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tradeoffs between cost and care, the influence of the Rule of
Rescue is not unlimited.94 Accordingly, HMO regulations must
address the tension between the economic necessity of cost
reduction and patients' firm commitment to the Rule of Rescue.
III. EXISTING HMO REGULATION
Popular distrust of HMOs does not stem from a lack of
legislative attention. More than 500 bills directly affecting
HMOs were introduced in state legislatures in 1994 and at
least twenty-four HMO bills were actually enacted that year,
along with insurance laws and other laws affecting managed
care plans.95 The pace is accelerating: in the first half of 1996
alone, thirty-three states enacted HMO laws.96 HMOs are also
subject to federal legislation, and HMO operations are affected
to some degree by exposure to common law liability.9" Effecting
restrictive mandates can be "'a rallying point for people who
have bad feelings about managed care.' ,,98 The laws enacted
thus far, however, have done little to alleviate those "bad
feelings," because they fail to assure enrollees that their HMOs
will provide essential care should they become seriously ill.
A. State Legislation
Every state except Hawaii has adopted legislation explicitly
authorizing and regulating HMOs.9 9 The laws of twenty-eight
states °° are patterned after the Health Maintenance
94. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
95. See Garry Carneal & A. Marlie Gallmetzer, Legal Characteristics of the Health
Maintenance Organization, in HEALTHCARE FACILITIES LAW 261, 281-82 (Anne M.
Dellinger ed., Supp. 1995).
96. See Richard A. Knox, State Legislatures Take On HMOs' Managed-Care
Policies, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 1996, at A12 (discussing a report by Families USA,
a consumer advocacy group, praising this "'avalanche of state legislation'").
97. See infra Parts III.B and III.C.
98. Keith H. Hammonds, Newborn Babies, Bawling Moms, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 8,
1996, at 40, 40 (discussing the current pressure on state legislators to enact laws
requiring HMOs to pay for longer postpartum hospital stays).
99. See 2 FURROW ET AL, supra note 1, § 11-11(b), at 56.
100. See ALA. CODE §§ 27-21A-1 to -21A-32 (1986 & Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. §§
21-86.010 to .900 (Michie 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-76-101 to -131 (Michie 1992 &
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Organization Model Act (HMO Model Act) adopted by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners in 1973 and
most recently amended in 1991.101 Most states, including those
adopting the HMO Model Act, require that HMOs establish
reasonable grievance procedures for members dissatisfied with
an HMO's care.' °2 HMOs in most states must describe their
grievance procedure to state authorities during the licensing
process,10 3 and must maintain records of enrollee complaints,
which may be reviewed by the state insurance commissioner. 4
States adopting the Model Regulations accompanying the HMO
Model Act require HMOs to resolve patient grievances, or at
least make "a final determination," within ninety days. °5 In
all but a few states, the mandated grievance procedure begins
and ends within the HMO itself; an enrollee has no right to
present a grievance to a non-HMO physician or other body for
review. 106
Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-16-401 to -428 (1994 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 33221-1 to -21-29 (1992 & Supp. 1996); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/1-2 to /6-19 (West
1994); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-13-1-1 to -35-1 (West Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 514B.1 to .32 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:2001-:2027 (West
1995 & Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 4201-42 (West 1990 & Supp.
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62D.01-.30 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 83-41-301 to -365 (Supp. 1996); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 354.400-.550 (1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-31-101 to -405 (1995 & Supp. 1996); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-3292-32,180
(1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2J-1 to -44 (West 1996 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 59A-46-1 to -42 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-67-1 to -185 (1994); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-18.1-01 to -25 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1742.01-.44 (Anderson
1992 & Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-41-1 to -41-44 (1994 & Supp. 1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 38-33-10 to -310 (Law Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-
32-201 to -225 (1994 & Supp. 1996); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 20A.01-.36 (West
1981 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 5101-15 (1993 & Supp. 1996); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 38.2-4300 to -4321 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE §§ 33-25A-1 to -
25A-35 (1996 & Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 26-34-101 to -134 (Michie 1991 &
Supp. 1996).
101. See HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT (National Ass'n of Ins. Conm'rs 1991).
102. See id. § 11(A); Stayn, supra note 15, at 1703 n.203 (citing 38 state statutes
requiring reasonable internal grievance procedures).
103. See HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT § 3(C)(11); Stayn, supra note 15, at
1703 n.204 (citing 37 state statutes imposing this requirement).
104. See HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT § 11; Stayn, supra note 15, at 1705
n.209 (citing 23 state statutes imposing this requirement). Public access to these
records, however, is not often guaranteed. See id. at 1705 & n.210.
105. MODEL REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT RULES REGARDING CONTRACTS AND SERVS. OF
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGS. § 9(D)(3) (National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 1991). Few of the
HMO Model Act states have adopted these regulations. See 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-4
(1993); MONT. ADMIN. R. 6.6.2501-.2510 (1987); N.D. ADMIN. CODE §§ 45-06-07-01 to -
06-07-09 (1994); 69 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 22 (Supp. 1995); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R590-76-1
to -14 (1996); Va. Regs. Reg. 28 (1987).
106. A handful of states do provide for nonjudicial appeals outside the HMO. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b) (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 408.7056,
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Enrollees may find it difficult to gauge the importance of this
right because they lack the information necessary to assess
their physicians' possible biases. The HMO Model Act pro-
scribes only outright deception, prohibiting "provisions or
statements which are unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading,
deceptive, or which encourage misrepresentation" in HMO
contracts and other information provided to enrollees.' °7 Thus,
the states do not require HMOs to reveal to patients how their
physicians are paid, or to explain how their compensation
arrangements reward doctors who provide cheaper care.
In lieu of these safeguards, the HMO Model Act relies upon
an "ongoing internal quality assurance program"'1 8 to ensure
adequate levels of care.0 9 Such a program requires a "written
statement of goals and objectives which emphasizes improved
health status in evaluating the quality of care," ' and a
"system of ongoing evaluation activities""' that are "focused."" 2
The statement must also include "[wiritten plans for taking
appropriate corrective action whenever, as determined by the
quality assurance program, inappropriate or subs tandard
services have been provided or services which should have been
furnished have not been provided.""' 3
641.511 (Harrison 1996); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-6, 125/4-10 (West 1994); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.21088, 333.20126(1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.11 (West
1996); W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-12 (1996).
107. HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT §§ 8(A)(2), 8(C)(2). Professor Clark
Havighurst suggests that physician incentives may violate the language of this HMO
Model Act provision:
The striking fact about incentive arrangements in plan-provider agreements is
that they are generally not disclosed or alluded to in plan-subscriber contracts.
On the contrary, the latter contracts often deny any plan responsibility for the
quality of care or hold out reassuringly that participating providers are governed
by professional norms and standards. Such disclaimers and reassurances might
be deemed to be misleading or unfair to consumers.
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICE& PRIVATE CONTRA-IS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH
REFORM 122 (1995).
108. HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT § 7(B).
109. See id. § 7(A) (providing that quality assurance programs must "assure that
the health care services provided to enrollees shall be rendered under reasonable
standards of quality of care consistent with prevailing professionally recognized
standards of medical practice").
110. Id. § 7(B)(1).
111. Id. § 7(B)(2)(e).
112. Id. § 7(B)(2)(f).
113. Id. § 7(B)(5) (emphasis added); cf id. § 7(B)(3)-(4) (requiring a "written
statement describing the system [regarding]: . .. [piroblem assessment, identification,
selection, and study; [clorrective action, monitoring, evaluation and reassessment; and
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The HMO Model Act's confidence in internal quality checks
is troubling. First, HMO self-evaluations tend not to be real-
istic: HMOs routinely overestimate the amount of preventative
care they provide" 4 and overcount patients who profess satis-
faction in the HMOs' own surveys." 5 Moreover, this form of
regulation leaves state authorities without real power over
HMO operations. While the appropriate state agency may
regulate an HMO's self-evaluation processes, 1 6 it cannot
require an HMO to take any "corrective action" that the HMO
deems unnecessary.1 1 7 In other words, the HMO Model Act
empowers state regulators only to ensure that a "quality
assurance program" exists-not that it in fact works to assure
quality.
These shortcomings are not addressed in the diverse state
legislation enacted to supplement or replace the HMO Model
Act. These laws typically rein in HMOs in ways not endorsed
by the drafters of the HMO Model Act." 8 Many of these ini-
tiatives fall into three categories. So-called "any willing pro-
vider" laws force an HMO to add to its network any provider
that meets certain broad criteria,"9 rendering it impossible to
limit patients to the most thrifty providers. "Freedom of choice"
laws achieve the same result by requiring coverage for services
obtained outside an HMO's network. 20 And "mandated benefits"
legislation prohibits the exclusion of certain treatments, even
[interpretation and analysis of patterns of care rendered to individual patients by
individual providers," and "identiflying the] method of topic selection, study, data
collection, analysis, interpretation and report format"). Maryland requires external
review of quality assurance plans. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 19-705.1(f) (1996
& Supp. 1996).
114. See Mahar, supra note 2, at 34.
115. See id. at 34-35 (comparing 98% satisfaction rate reported by HMOs with
lower rate found in Gallup survey).
116. See HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT § 3(C)(12) (requiring details of the
proposed quality assurance program to be submitted with state license application);
id. § 7(C) (allowing access by state regulators to the minutes of "proceedings of formal
quality assurance program activities"); id. § 7(E) (allowing access by state regulators
to enrollee clinical records).
117. See id. § 7(B)(5).
118. See Carneal & Gallmetzer, supra note 95, at 279-92.
119. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-46-35 (Michie 1995); W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-31
(1996); see also Wendy Wendland, Health Bills Would Give Patients Options, DET. FREE
PRESS, May 21, 1996, at 1B (describing proposed Michigan legislation mandating "open
enrollment to new doctors every two years").
120. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-21-29 (Supp. 1996) (granting enrollees the right
to select a "point-of-service option" which permits enrollees to obtain services outside
of their HMO's provider network).
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through an explicit policy provision.121 Some mandated benefits
are common: twenty states require HMOs to provide mental
health services, and twenty-seven states mandate coverage for
the treatment of alcohol or substance abuse.'22 Other provisions
vary, and many states mandate an eclectic menu of required
services. California, for example, requires HMOs to provide
prenatal genetic screening in cases of high-risk pregnancy,
123
and New Mexico HMOs must provide acupuncture.'24 Critics
of these provisions note their potential to increase health care
costs by preventing the HMO and its enrollee from excluding
expensive, unwanted coverages from the contract. "Any willing
provider" laws, "freedom of choice" laws, and "mandated
benefits" initiatives are considered "anti-managed care laws"
by the HMO industry, which views them as fundamentally
inconsistent with the concept of managed care.'25
B. The Federal HMO Act
Overlaid on state regulations is the federal Health Mainte-
nance Organization Act of 1973 (HMO Act), 2 ' enacted by
Congress to encourage the proliferation of HMOs.'27 Compliance
with the Act is not mandatory, but only HMOs that meet its
criteria qualify for its protections, including federal preemption
of certain restrictive state laws. 2  Because provisions in the
121. See 2 FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, § 11-11(b), at 58-59.
122. See Carneal & Gallmetzer, supra note 95, at 286.
123. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.7 (West 1990).
124. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-46-36 (Michie 1995).
125. See Carneal & Gallmetzer, supra note 95, at 282, 284.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 300e to 300e-17 (1994).
127. See Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. (87 Stat. 914) 3033420.
128. As originally enacted, the HMO Act provided strong incentives for an HMO
to qualify: many employers were required to offer employees a federally qualified HMO
option, and federal grants, loans, and loan guarantees were available to qualified
HMOs. See LAWRENCE D. BROWN, POLITICS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION: HMOs AS
FEDERAL POLICY 239-67 (1983). Under the current HMO Act, federal support of qualified
HMOs is limited. Certain employers offering their employees a federally qualified HMO
option may not "financially discriminate against an employee who enrolls in such [an]
organization." 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(c) (1994). Additionally, the Act preempts the
application to federally qualified HMOs of restrictive state laws requiring (1) medical
society approval of HMO providers; (2) that physicians constitute all or part of an
HMO's governing body; (3) that a percentage of physicians in the HMO's area be
permitted to join the network as providers; or (4) that HMOs meet state insurance
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HMO Act designed to protect enrollees generally mirror those
found in state law applying to all HMOs, "the current federal
system provides minimal substantive and procedural
protections for non-Medicare members of HMOs."' 29
Like HMOs regulated by most state laws, a federally quali-
fied HMO must establish "meaningful procedures"'3 ° for an
enrollee to take his complaint to the "appropriate HMO
decisionmaking levels."'' However, the HMO need not allow
a non-HMO physician or reviewing body to resolve grievances.
As under state law, federal law does not require HMOs to
disclose any methods of physician compensation that may
reduce the level or quality of services provided.'32 Federally
mandated "quality assurance program[s" 133 are also comparable
to those required by the state HMO Model Act.134 Federal
quality assurance programs must "[s]tress[I health outcomes
to the extent consistent with the state of the art"'1' and provide
for "taking appropriate remedial action whenever, as deter-
mined under the quality assurance program, inappropriate or
substandard services have been provided or services that ought
to have been furnished have not been provided."
36
The HMO Act diverges somewhat from state law in its
"mandated benefits" provisions, which form the primary hurdles
to federal qualification. A qualified HMO must offer a broad
array of "basic health services" 3 v including, among other things,
short-term physical therapy, 38 short-term mental health
services, 39 treatment and referral services for alcohol and drug
regulations regarding initial capitalization and insolvency protections. See id. § 300e-
10(a). The Act further provides that states may not prohibit a federally qualified HMO
from "advertising its services, charges, or other nonprofessional aspects of its
operation." Id. § 300e-10(b). With these exceptions, federally qualified HMOsmust
comply with the same state laws as non-qualified HMOs.
129. Stayn, supra note 15, at 1702.
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c)(5); 42 C.F.R. § 417.124(g) (1995).
131. 42 C.F.R. § 417.124(g)(1).
132. See id. § 417.124(b) (listing disclosure requirements).
133. Id. § 417.106.
134. See HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORG. MODEL ACT § 7(B) (National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs
1991); supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
135. 42 C.F.R. § 417.106(a)(1).
136. Id. § 417.106(a)(4) (emphasis added).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1) (1994).
138. See 42 C.F.R. § 417.101(a)(2)(iii).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(1)(D); 42 C.F.R. § 417.101(a)(4). This mandated benefit
may be only a partial solution to the problem of inadequate mental health coverage.
According to psychiatrists, short-term mental health care is sufficient for some
conditions but inadequate for others. See Daniel Goleman, Critics Say Managed-Care
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abuse, 140 home health services,"' "a broad range of voluntary
family planning services," 142 and infertility services.143 Almost
half of all HMOs do not satisfy these requirements and operate
under state law without federal qualification.
144
C. Common Law Liability
Under the federal and state law outlined above, an HMO
enrollee denied vital care must often choose to either forego the
desired treatment or resort to litigation. The threat of litiga-
tion, against either the HMO itself or an HMO provider, may
be the most effective deterrent of improper care denials cur-
rently available to enrollees. In some courts, an HMO itself
may incur vicarious malpractice liability under principles of
agency if the HMO "'conducts itself in a fashion akin to a
health care provider.' ,145 However, many states reject this
ground of liability, providing by statute that an HMO itself is
not to be deemed to practice medicine. 146
.More common is the medical malpractice suit brought directly
against an HMO physician who attempts to cut costs too
radically.147 In a recent California case,'48 for example,; the
family of a deceased HMO patient brought suit against her
primary-care physician alleging that for several months, while
Savings Are Eroding Mental Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at C9. One study found
the worst outcomes among seriously depressed patients enrolled in health plans
limiting the number of treatment sessions. See id.
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(1)(E); 42 C.F.R. § 417.101(a)(5).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(1)(G); 42 C.F.R. § 417.101(a)(7).
142. 42 C.F.R. § 417.101(a)(8)(i).
143. See id. § 417.101(a)(8)(ii).
144. See 2 FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, § 11-11(a), at 55.
145. 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 13, § 8-2(b), at 484 (quoting Decker v. Saini, 14
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1556, 1991 WL 277590 (Mich. Cir. Ct., 1991)). Other
courts have applied this doctrine. See, e.g., Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of
the Mid-Atl. States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Sloan v. Metro. Health Council
of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); McClellan v. Health
Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. 1992), af/d, No. 78E.D. 1995,1996
WL 717460, at *1 (Pa. Dec. 12, 1996); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229
(Pa. Super. 1988).
146. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-32,170 (1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-41-15
(Michie 1996).
147. See MASTERS ET AL., supra note 8, § 1120.
148. Ching v. Gaines, No. CV 137656 (Super. Ct., Ventura County, Cal., Nov. 15,
1995).
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the patient suffered abdominal pain and rectal bleeding, the
doctor delayed ordering a test that would have diagnosed her
colon cancer.149 Although the physician denied that cost was a
factor, the patient's family stressed that the entire cost of the
$450 test would have been absorbed by the physician himself
under his contract with the HMO.' 50 Ajury awarded the family
$2.9 million.
151
Where HMO administrators instead of a network physician
have unreasonably withheld services, a contract-based claim
or a tort-based bad faith action may also result in a sizable
damage award. In one case, a forty-year-old woman died of
breast cancer after her HMO denied her a bone marrow
transplant. 5 2 The HMO stressed that the transplant procedure
was not a proven safe and effective treatment for advanced
breast cancer.'53 Unsympathetic to the HMO's arguments, the
jury found that the HMO had breached its contract and award-
ed damages of $89.3 million-the highest award against an
HMO to date.
154
Other potential theories of liability 55 are not consistently
available to aggrieved HMO enrollees. 156 However, the avail-
ability of various theories is irrelevant to the many patients
149. For reports on this case, see Brink, supra note 28, at 62-64; Paul Elias,
Doctors Negligent in Woman's Cancer Death, Jury Finds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995,
at A3; Notable Verdicts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at All.
150. See Brink, supra note 28, at 62.
151. This award was reduced to $700,000 because of California's cap on non-
economic damages. See id.
152. See Eckholm, supra note 3, at Al.
153. See id. at A12.
154. See id. The award was vacated on appeal, and the parties settled for an
undisclosed amount. See Roger Parloff, The HMO Foes, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1996, at
81, 85.
155. See William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health
Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 487 (1991) (listing negligent
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with the physician-patient
relationship, and fraud).
156. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 693, 708-09 (1994) (noting inconsistent case law). One class action, however, has
begun to pursue a novel theory of liability. See Teti v. U.S. Healthcare, No. 88-9808
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1989), affd, 904 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1990). As the attorney described
the claim, "'U.S. Healthcare signed up all these people but didn't disclose the tricky
financial arrangements they have with their physicians.'" Faith Lyman Ham, RICO
Statute Violated by HMO, Suit Alleges, PHILADELPHIA Bus. J., Jan. 9-15, 1989, at 1.
The complaint, which was filed in federal court alleging violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO), was dismissed for want
of jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs have refiled in state court. See MARC A. RODWIN,
MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 348 & n.58 (1993).
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who enroll in an HMO through an employee benefit plan. These
patients' common-law claims against HMOs are generally
precluded by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 5 7 which preempts "any and all State laws"
that "relate to" an employee benefit plan.15 ERISA was enacted
before the rapid growth of managed care, with the intent to
protect employees. '59 Now, however, ERISA effectively preempts
the state law that provides the basis for most actions brought
against HMOs, thereby depriving many aggrieved patients of
any remedy. Claims based on an HMO's denial of coverage,'
as well as actions alleging misrepresentations to enrollees or
failure to disclose essential information,' 6 ' are preempted.
Widespread disapproval with this result'6 2 has yet to effectuate
change.
The judicial remedies not preempted by ERISA are never-
theless a poor method of regulating HMOs. First, the mere
availability of a remedy has little deterrent value. Evidence
suggests that an HMO often will ignore obligations enforced
through common law until a suit appears imminent, perhaps
assuming that the HMO's enrollee is unaware that the HMO's
action may be challenged in court or that the enrollee is
unwilling to expend time and money to initiate litigation during
a health crisis.6 3 Second, the deterrent effect of common law
157. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
158. Id. § 1144(a). Although laws that "regulate insurance" are not preempted by
ERISA, id. § 1144(b)(2)(A), an employee benefit plan, including an HMO that provides
services to employees, cannot be "deemed ... an insurance company" to avoid preemp-
tion. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
159. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent, an ERISA
sponsor, citing "the protection afforded participants" as "the crowning achievement
of this legislation").
160. See, e.g., Makar v. Health Care Corp. of the Mid-Atl. (Carefirst), 872 F.2d 80,
82 (4th Cir. 1989) (approving removal of a coverage dispute to federal court because
of ERISA preemption); Scullion v. Travelers Health Network, 720 F. Supp. 530, 531
(W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that plaintiffs claim against his HMO for refusal of coverage
is governed by ERISA).
161. See, e.g., Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a state law claim based on alleged misrepresentations is preempted by
ERISA),
162. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir.
1992) ("Fundamental changes such as the widespread institution of utilization review
would seem to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to serve its
noble purpose of safeguarding the interests of employees."); see also Oversight Hearing
on the Effect of ERISA's Preemption Provision on State Health Care Reform Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
103d Cong. (1993).
163. See William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance
Companies of Coverage for Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer,
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liability is not accurately targeted toward unjustified denials
of care. Where a suit does result, a court or jury confronted
with complex and conflicting medical testimony will usually
favor a sick patient over a corporate entity that claims a
particular treatment is too expensive, experimental, or not
medically necessary,1 64 and may order an HMO to pay tremen-
dous damages regardless of whether the HMO's conduct was
truly unreasonable. As a result, when an enrollee hires a
lawyer, the HMO may yield to almost any demand for a
service-whether essential or wasteful. To the extent common
law liability successfully deters HMO misconduct, it also
interferes with HMOs' legitimate cost-containment efforts.
165
330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 473,476 (1994) (discussing a finding by researchers at the Duke
University Bone Marrow Transplant Program that insurers' coverage determinations
for treatment of patients in certain clinical trials of cancer therapy seemed "arbitrary
and capricious," frequently depending on whether the insured was represented by
counsel); Susan Brink, The Cancer Wars at HMOs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 5,
1996, at 69, 69 (noting that an effective means of obtaining coverage is through hiring
a lawyer as illustrated by the Duke University study).
164. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1644-62 (1992) (describing and noting the
impact of common judicial devices for stretching coverage beyond that provided in the
contract to include care needed by ill patients); id. at 1676-81 (noting judicial biases
toward individual versus group preferences).
165. See id. at 1658-62. Addtionally, it would appear that these two aspects of
judicial regulation may combine to encourage discrimination against an HMO's most
seriously ill enrollees. Suppose, for example, that an HMO could achieve the cost
savings it desires in two ways: it could either deny the unnecessary, but low-cost,
treatments demanded by a thousand of its enrollees or deny the expensive treatments
desperately needed by ten critically ill patients. Although each of the ten has greater
incentive to sue the HMO, these seriously ill patients may be less aggressive because
of their poor health and may be resigned to suffering continuing health problems. More
significantly, HMO administrators might simply conclude that the probability of a
lawsuit is lower if the HMO angers only ten enrollees rather than a thousand. The
strength of the claims by the ten seriously ill patients may ultimately prove irrelevant;
the HMO, alarmed by the size of the potential award in any suit, may predict that
the number of claims against it will count far more than the merit of those claims.
The HMO in this hypothetical might therefore provide the low-cost treatments and
deny the high-cost ones without regard for their relative benefits. In this way, reliance
on common law principles instead of statutory provisions may exacerbate HMOs'
tendency to meet the needs of their healthiest enrollees first.
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IV. REFORM
Because existing mechanisms fail to guarantee the vital care
HMO patients justifiably expect, a shift in regulatory emphasis
is needed. This Part endorses broad principles of regulation
relying on patients, their physicians, and the health care
market to strike a balance between cost reduction and compre-
hensive medical care. After setting forth four proposals, this
Part concludes that together, these reforms would allow for cost
containment while delivering to patients essential care as
defined by the patients themselves.
Although a full evaluation of the merits of state versus
federal regulation is beyond the scope of this Note,166 the
discussion below assumes for several reasons that the task of
reform is best left to the states. First, permitting the states to
regulate independently will allow a variety of innovations to
be tested simultaneously while containing the consequences of
less successful approaches.167 Second, "health care is a product
packaged and delivered in local markets," 6 ' and the "financing
and delivery of health care depend on relations between in-
surers and local providers of care.""6 s Finally, two leading
advocates of a federalist approach, Professors Jerry Mashaw
and Theodore Marmor, note:
Political judgments about particular reform proposals are
products of personal experience, political ideology, and local
economic and social conditions. These factors change
166. An informative debate on this topic can be found in a recent issue of the
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW. This issue features an article advocating a federalist
approach by professors Jerry Mashaw and Theodore Marmor, see Jerry L. Mashaw
& Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 115 (1995), along with critical responses from academics and health care
professionals, see Commentary, On the Future of State Health Care Reform, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 113 (1995).
167. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 166, at 117 ("If it is uncertain how any
new proposal would work out in practice, why run a single experiment, which might
fail, on the whole country at once?").
168. Cohodes, supra note 56, at 86; see also Mahar, supra note 2, at 32 (noting
evidence "suggesting that local doctors and hospitals-not central administrators-can
have the biggest influence on quality").
169. Cohodes, supra note 56, at 96; see also John E. Kralewski et al., Strategies
Employed by HMOs to Achieve Hospital Discounts: A Case Study of Seven HMOs,
HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV., Winter 1991, at 9, 10, 15 (describing how HMOs expend
efforts locally to negotiate the fees they pay network providers).
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substantially as one moves about the United States. If
change is to be workable and acceptable, it must take
account of the real differences between New York and
Idaho, Wisconsin and Louisiana.
170
Other commentators have called for federal law preempting
state HMO regulation, citing the states' failure to enact ade-
quate regulations thus far17' and the multistate presence of
some HMOs and health care purchasers. 172 While the four
reform proposals below are directed toward state lawmakers,
these principles could also be given effect through federal
legislation.
170. Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 166, at 116.
171. In 1996, at least a few states are considering reform measures that may afford
significant protections to enrollees. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 96, at A12 (surveying
recent state actions); Vincent J. Schodolski, Alleged HMO Abuses Spur California
Ballot Issues, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13, 1996, at 1 (quoting opinion of consumer-rights
advocate that California has "led the race to the bottom in terms of quality," but noting
that now the state is "poised to lead a national backlash" against HMO abuses);
sources cited supra note 106; infra notes 179, 214-15, 221-24, 227-32 and accompa-
nying text.
172. See, e.g., K. Peter Schmidt, Problems With Health Care Federalism, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 147, 147 (1995). Schmidt writes:
The "federalist" approach to health care ... ignores one simple fact: many
important health care actors are, in effect, citizens of the nation, or regions
thereof, rather than citizens of a single state....
.... Quite understandably, the sponsors of plans that provide health care
benefits in more than one state do not all view as a panacea "reforms" that
subject them to a crazy quilt of varying state regulation.
Id. Professors Mashaw and Marmor respond that
multi-state employers within the United States must adapt their offerings to the
realities of local health care provision. General Motors cannot, in good faith, offer
its workers in Tennessee the same HMO package that it offers its workers in
California. Differences in the availability of HMO services, the capacities of
HMOs that exist, differential pricing policies from place to place, and differing
state regulation of the practice of medicine all require that multi-state corpora-
tions already take into account of [sic] local differences when constructing
employee health benefit options. No one can estimate reliably the marginal
increase in this preexisting complexity that would result from increased state
authority to regulate health insurance plans.
Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Federalism and Health Care: A Reply, 28
CONN. L. REV. 161, 162-63 (1995).
174
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A. Principles of Patient-Responsive Regulation
1. Prohibit coercive physician incentives-Legislatures
should prohibit the most coercive physician incentives currently
employed by HMOs. Until recently, methods of calculating
physician pay endured considerable scrutiny but little legisla-
tive action. Representative Pete Stark of California proposed
the elimination of all physician incentive systems in 1986.173
The resulting federal statute174 prohibits hospitals from offering
financial rewards to physicians "as an inducement to reduce
or limit services provided" to Medicare and Medicaid patients,
175
but its application to private-market HMOs was delayed after
HMOs complained that the statute would prohibit widely
accepted cost-reduction procedures. 176 A 1990 federal law
prohibited Medicare HMOs from furnishing to physicians any
"specific payment ... as an inducement to reduce or limit
medically necessary services,"7 7 and Congress has considered
several health care reform bills that would have subjected
private health care plans to this prohibition. 7 Some states are
now preparing similar legislation. Massachusetts, for example,
is considering a bill that would prohibit HMOs from entering
into "'any compensation arrangement with a health care
provider that may directly or indirectly have the effect of
reducing or limiting services furnished to any person enrolled
in a health plan.' ,179 If enacted, the effects of such legislation
173. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9313(c),
100 Stat. 1874, 2003-04, amended by Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4Q16,101 Stat. 1330, 1330-
64 (1987), Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6207, 103 Stat. 2245 (1989). Taken literally, this
elimination would be impossible; as one HMO advocate pointed out, "All pricing
mechanisms for medical services have some inherent incentives." Ham, supra note
156, at 1.
174. 42 US.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1) (1994).
175. Id.
176. See 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 13, § 8-2(d), at 488 n.33; Hall, supra note 156,
at 707; Alan L. Hillman et. al., Contractual Arrangements Between HMOs and Primary
Care Physicians: Three-Tiered HMOs and Risk Pools, 30 MED. CARE 136, 136 (1992).
177. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4204(a)(1),
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-108 to -109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(8)(A)(i) (1994)).
Rules implementing this legislation have been repeatedly delayed. See Carol Jouzaitis
& David S. Cloud, HMO Reforms Delayed: Critics Blame Politics, CHI. TRIB., July 9,
1996, § 1, at 1.
178. See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993).
179. Alex Pham, Limits on HMOs Win Backing of Trade Group: Bill to Curb
Financial Incentives to Doctors to Cut Costs of Care, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10, 1996, at
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would be far-reaching: sixty-eight percent of HMOs employing
their own physicians, and eighty-four percent of other HMOs,
reduce costs through some type of physician financial incen-
tive.
180
Although these measures show that lawmakers have iden-
tified a primary cause of improper care denials, the aggressive
proposals to date may have overstated the problems of physi-
cian incentives. First, the potential dangers of these incentives
are mitigated by physicians' natural loyalty to patients and
their perception of good medicine.' Moreover, the less drastic
incentives to cut costs may well serve a legitimate purpose by
counteracting physicians' tendencies to perform certain un-
wanted and ineffective procedures.'82 Lawmakers should
therefore abandon efforts to extinguish every physician finan-
cial incentive, and focus instead on those payment schemes
most likely to subvert doctors' independent medical judg-
ments. 
183
Perhaps the most controversial cost control is a system of
physician compensation known as "capitation." 84 In its purest
form, a doctor contracts with the HMO to serve as the primary
care physician for a specified group of HMO enrollees. 8 5
Instead of reimbursing the doctor for the care he actually
provides, the HMO provides a flat monthly payment for each
enrollee assigned to him. 8 6 The physician receives this per
40. Curiously, the bill specifically does not ban capitation, one type of particularly
powerful incentive. See id. California voters rejected similar proposals when they
considered two ballot initiatives in November of 1996. See David R. Olmos, Experts
Foresee More Efforts to Reform HMO Regulation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at D4; cf
Schodolski, supra note 171, at 1.
180. See Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-
Care Plans Make With Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678 (1995).
18 1. See EUOr FEIDsON, IcIIuNG TOGmERZ A SIUDY OF POISIONAL SOCIAL CNIOWL
86-101 (1971).
182. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
183. The American Medical Association has noted: "The greater the strength of
the incentive, the more likely it will create a serious conflict of interest which could
lead to patient harm." Joseph F. Sullivan, Officials Scrutinizing Doctor Bonuses in
Managed Care Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1995, at B6 (quoting 1994 report from
the AMA's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs).
184. A 1995 study found that 56% of HMOs contracting with outside physicians
and 34% of HMOs employing their own physicians use capitation as their chief method
of physician compensation. See Gold et al., supra note 180, at 1681 tbl.3. "Many health
care futurists are predicting that capitation will become a predominant method of
reimbursement to providers for health care services by the end of the decade," in large
part because of increased participation in HMOs. MASTERS ET AL., supra note 8, § 110.
185. See MASTERS ET AL., supra note 8, § 170.
186. See id. § 1100.
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capita payment each month regardless of whether the patient
seeks care, and regardless of the time and money the doctor
spends caring for the patient. 187 Thus, pure capitation exactly
reverses the financial incentives of a physician accustomed to
fee-for-service reimbursement: "every time a patient comes into
the doctor's office it's a liability, not an asset." 88 In effect, the
physician himself underwrites his patients' care. 89
The incentives of capitation can be overpowering when a
patient becomes critically ill because these patients pose the
greatest danger to a provider's financial stability. 9 ° Capitation
may also adversely affect patients who only need minor care.
As one hospital administrator explained: "If you are a bunch
of doctors or a hospital, and you see you are over budget, you
begin to cut corners."' 9 To increase profitability, a provider
may take on additional patients or spend less time and money
on each current enrollee.'92 While capitation may lead to patient
complaints,'93 physicians themselves are often the most vocal
critics. Doctors recognize that "'it's the morals and ethics of
physicians that will make the system work' ,'9" but some fear
that" 'this system is robbing physicians of their essential good-
ness.' "9' One doctor noted that to profit-motivated capitated
care providers, "the best possible outcome is that the patient
die without receiving any care just after the capitation payment
arrives. This isn't a slippery slope; it's a cliff."'19
187. See id. § 170.
188. Larson, supra note 35, at 47.
189. See MASTERS ET AL., supra note 8, § 1100.
190. See Michael T. Isbell, AIDS and Access to Care: Lessons for Health Care
Reformers, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 24 (1993).
191. Suzanne Woolley, Physician, Restrain Thyself, BUS. WK., Sept. 13, 1993, at
34.
192. See id. at 32; Mechanic, supra note 92, at 1731 ("Most physicians are individ-
ually responsible for at least several hundred patients and must apportion their time
and efforts in some reasonable relationship to their competing patients' needs-as well
as to their own needs for leisure.").
193. One patient complained of his HMO doctor: "We were being herded through
like cattle." Woolley, supra note 191, at 32.
194. Perry, supra note 9, at 110, 114 (quoting Dr. Thomas Reardon, a trustee of
the American Medical Association).
195. Larson, supra note 35, at 46 (quoting Dr. Roy B. Jones, a University of
Colorado bone marrow transplant specialist).
196. Norman A. Paradis, Letter to the Editor, Market Forces Can't Drive Doctors'
Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995, at A20. But cf J. Kevin McCurren, Factors for
Success: Capitated Primary Physicians in Medicare HMOs, HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV.,
Spring 1991, at 49, 52 (surveying physicians chosen for the study by their HMOs and
finding that the doctors stressed "the positive aspects" of capitation and dismissed
"the risk aspect" of capitation).
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Legislation curbing these effects might allow capitation only
when tempered by other mechanisms designed to ensure quality
care. In some HMOs, for example, capitated physicians are
eligible for year-end bonuses based on surveys of patient
satisfaction. 97 Legislation might mandate this practice or allow
HMOs to substitute other measures of quality, perhaps reward-
ing capitated physicians on the basis of how many patients
receive immunizations or other services indicating physician
attention.'98 Still, this proposal is hardly a panacea: survey
responses by healthy enrollees say little about whether a
capitated doctor would spend his own money to provide exten-
sive care to a chronically ill enrollee.'99 Doctors might respond
to such requirements by boosting their low-cost services without
increasing the care they provide to their patients who need
more expensive services.
A more effective measure would simply abolish capitation,
forcing HMOs to employ less drastic incentives to cut costs. An
HMO may, for example, use a system of bonuses to influence
its primary-care physicians in their role as "gatekeepers,"
discouraging them from referring patients to medical specialists
unnecessarily. In one HMO, if the 925 patients assigned to one
primary-care physician use specialist care in a given month
costing the HMO $14.49 or less per patient, the HMO awards
the doctor a bonus of $1323, but if the average cost of specialist
care rises to $30.49 the doctor gets nothing. 00 A "withhold" is
a similar incentive and achieves the same results. For exam-
ple, the HMO could reimburse the physician eighty percent of
the cost of his services, while withholding the remaining twenty
percent until the end of the fiscal year. At that time, the HMO
might deduct from the withheld amount one dollar for every
ten dollars by which the physician exceeded the target for his
total annual expenditures.20
197. See Performance-Based Payment Yields Cost, Quality Pluses, PHYSICIAN
MANAGER, Jan. 6, 1995, at 8.
198. See MASTERS ET AL., supra note 8, §§ 950-958 (describing how to measure health
care quality through "consumer research").
199. See Brink, supra note 28, at 64.
200. The physician bonuses used in this example are actual incentives used by U.S.
Healthcare. See Paul Gray, Gagging the Doctors, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 50, 50
(providing "examples of the U.S. Healthcare incentive system, taken from its own
documents").
201. See HIRSH & WILCOX, supra note 8, at 17; Sullivan, supra note 183, at B6.
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Bonuses and withholds may be preferable to pure capitation
as a significant but weaker determinant of physician behav-
ior.2 °2 In the previous example, the difference between a low
average specialist cost and a high average cost is worth at least
$14,800 to the HMO, but at most $1323 to the physician.
Within this range, the physician bears some responsibility for
the specialist costs she incurs, which discourages needless
referrals. Because her monetary stake is always less than ten
percent of the referral costs, however, this incentive is not
overwhelming. Moreover, the physician has no additional
incentive to refer so few patients to specialists that their
average cost falls below $14.49, and if in her judgment a few
of her patients require extremely expensive specialist services
she stands to lose no more than $1323. In this way, the sharing
of costs between doctors and HMOs-a central feature of
managed care-is preserved without seriously compromising
patient care.
2. Mandate disclosure of physician incentives-HMOs
should be required to disclose how their care providers are
compensated in marketing materials and at enrollment.2 °3 In
the absence of mandated disclosure, most enrollees remain
ignorant of physician incentive systems.20 4 Patients contem-
plating HMO enrollment do not learn how the HMO's providers
are paid from the plan's brochures,20 5 and HMOs do not volun-
teer this information in contracts or other post-enrollment
materials.20 6 Patients rarely ask physicians directly how their
pay is calculated, both out of embarrassment and because they
do not know what questions to ask.20 7 Moreover, physicians may
be prohibited by so-called "gag" clauses in their HMO contracts
from revealing their financial arrangements with HMOs. 2°" Not
202. See Alan L. Hillman, Financial Incentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There
a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1743, 1748 (1987).
203. See Douglas F. Levinson, Toward Full Disclosure ofReferral Restrictions and
Financial Incentives by Prepaid Health Plans, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1729, 1729 (1987);
Deven C. McGraw, Note, Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians
be Required to Disclose these to Patients?, 83 GEo. L.J. 1821, 1824-25 (1995).
204. See McGraw, supra note 203, at 1836-37; see also CLARK C. HAVIGHURST,
DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 78-83 (1982) (noting that patient ignorance
impedes operation of the health care market).
205. See Brink, supra note 28, at 63.
206. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 107, at 122.
207. See Brink, supra note 28, at 62-63 (quoting researcher Marsha Gold: "What
I do is look at health care incentives, and it took me two years to figure out this
stuff.").
208. See id. at 63; Robert Pear, Doctors Say HMOs Limit What They Can Tell
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at Al. HMOs argue that "gag" clauses are
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surprisingly, the majority of new HMO enrollees in one study
incorrectly believed that "in this plan the doctor is only con-
cerned about my health and not limiting the plan's cost." °9
Awareness of an HMO's physician compensation arrangement
before enrollment is critical because it is one of few concrete
predictors of how aggressively an HMO will respond to serious
illness. HMO telephone representatives sometimes provide
information to prospective enrollees that is incomplete, false,
or misleading. Quality ratings and accreditation surveys by
independent organizations are controversial, incomplete, and
confusing.21' Advance disclosure of physician compensation
arrangements would empower each prospective enrollee to
select a plan geared to the types of care she desires. Those
prospective enrollees most concerned with the availability of
high-cost interventions to combat serious illness, for example,
might be willing to pay higher premiums or forego other
benefits to join an HMO with less coercive incentives or no
incentives at all. Improved disclosure could also educate
enrollees about the benefits and drawbacks of managed care,
reducing disputes stemming from enrollees' unrealistic expecta-
tions. 2
Many doctors support advance disclosure, arguing that telling
patients up front about physician incentives is the only way to
preserve patients' trust in the profession.2 13 Currently, patients
often learn of physician incentives only when they become
seriously ill and seek to discover why their doctors will not
intended only to protect trade secrets, to prevent physicians who contract with multiple
plans from encouraging patients to continue to receive their services under a different
plan, and to discourage doctors from stirring unnecessary anxiety which may lessen
the effectiveness of patient care. See id. An AMA lawyer reports anecdotal evidence
that doctors will answer such questions even if forbidden by their contracts with the
HMO. See Brink, supra note 28, at 63.
209. Mechanic, supra note 92, at 1732 (citing David Mechanic et al., Choos-
ing Among Health Insurance Options: A Study of New Employees, 27 INQUIRY 14, 17
tbl.2 (1990)).
210. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Public Advocate Report Says H.M.O.'s Vary Widely in
Quality and Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1996, at B4 (quoting the opinion of New York
City's Public Advocate that ''H.M.O.'s routinely distribute vague, false, conflicting
or inadequate information to prospective enrollees'" over the telephone about, for
example, the qualifications of HMO physicians).
211. See Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 9. Gottlieb notes that in surveys, "[s]icker
people tend to be more critical of plans even when they perform well. Older people
are often more generous in their assessments, especially if doctors or nurses take
interest in them.' Id.
212. See generally Levinson, supra note 203; McGraw, supra note 203.
213. See Brink, supra note 28, at 63.
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administer expensive treatments or provide referrals to medical
specialists. An enrollee who learns at this late point that her
physician has a financial stake in reducing the care available
to her is likely to feel betrayed.
Increasing alarm about undisclosed physician financial
incentives has led to initial efforts at regulation. Massachusetts
and Delaware considered measures requiring disclosure as
early as the late 1980s,214 and lawmakers in other states 215 are
now weighing similar proposals. Federal lawmakers have
recently addressed this issue once again, but are reluctant to
adopt such measures over industry opposition." 6 HMOs have
resisted disclosure requirements, calling them "burdensome"
and asserting that they would impair their ability to negotiate
discounted fees with their affiliated providers.21 7 Lawmakers
should reject such arguments and implement these proposals
so that HMO physicians may be a source of patient information,
not misgivings.
3. Require binding review of HMO denials of care-Every
HMO patient who believes that he has been denied services
improperly should be guaranteed access to informal, quick, and
inexpensive dispute resolution. Under existing law, most such
214. See Harris Meyer, MD Incentives SuitAgainst HMO Dismissed; Issue Lingers,
AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 12, 1990, at 1.
215. See, e.g., Thomas L. Bromwell, Letter to the Editor, Compromising Health
Care, WASH. POST, June 16, 1996, at C8 (chairman of Maryland Senate Finance
Committee promising that in 1997 he will "introduce legislation to require health care
insurers and HMOs to inform their patients about how they pay their doctors and
explain, in plain English, how their payment plans work"); Richard N. Gottfried &
Alexander B. Grannis, Letter to the Editor, It's Time to Put Limits on Power of
H.M.O.'s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996, at A22 (the chairs of the New York State
Assembly committees on health and insurance describing New York legislative efforts
to mandate disclosure of physician incentives); Wendland, supra note 119, at 1B
(describing proposed Michigan legislation); see also Editorial, Unmuzzling HMO
Physicians: State and Federal Bills Aim at Treatment Option 'Gag Rules', L.A. TIMES,
July 2, 1996, at B6 [hereinafter Unmuzzling HMO Physicians] (discussing with
approval a provision in proposed California ballot initiative SB 1064). This initiative
was rejected by California voters in November of 1996. See Olmos, supra note 179,
at D4.
216. See, e.g., Unmuzzling HMO Physicians, supra note 215, at B6 (noting that
after compromises in Congress, the proposed Federal Patient Right to Know Act fails
to mandate disclosure of physician incentives).
217. See Wendland, supra note 119, at 2B (noting one HMO's objection that
Michigan's proposed mandated disclosures would "use a lot of paper and quickly be
out-of-date"); cf HMO Gag Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1996, at 18 (advocating rules
to require disclosure of compensation schemes without revealing precise dollar
amounts so that HMOs will retain their power to bargain for discounted fees with
individual physicians).
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enrollees must either forego treatment or file suit.218 The delays
and costs of litigation make it undesirable for both enrollee and
HMO, and the judicial process is an inadequate means of
achieving fair, informed resolutions of medical disputes. 9
States may avert much of the litigation between patients and
HMOs by mandating an informal arbitration process for
aggrieved enrollees. 220 A state pursuing this route might choose
to follow the example of Illinois, which provides for neutral
physician review of an HMO's determination that a covered
service is not "medically necessary., 221 When an Illinois HMO
refuses to provide a service recommended by the primary-care
physician, the enrollee seeking review, his doctor, and the HMO
jointly select a physician unaffiliated with the HMO to provide
a second opinion.222 If the reviewing physician finds that the
service is medically necessary, the HMO must provide cover-
age.223 Moreover, the HMO may not retaliate against the
physician who recommended the service in any matter affecting
his contract or employment. 224 A state establishing similar
arbitration procedures might vary the Illinois approach by
selecting a state-sponsored network of physicians to perform
such reviews instead of asking the enrollee, physician, and
225HMO to agree on a reviewing physician.
Alternatively, a state might establish an administrative
appeals procedure for enrollees dissatisfied with their HMOs'
services.226 The reviewing agency might make its determination
after reviewing documents submitted by the HMO and the
enrollee, 227 and might hold an informal hearing in an especially
218. See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
219. See discussion supra Part III.C.
220. See IRVINGLADIMER, DEMOCRATIC PROCESSFS FOR MODERN HEALTH AGENCIES 149-69
(1979) (detailing the mechanics of designing and contracting for arbitration within
HMOs).




225. This approach is taken by the federal Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA), which hears Medicare HMO appeals. The HCFA initiated this practice as
the result of a class action by Medicare beneficiaries alleging unreasonable delays in
HCFA's resolution of HMO appeals. See Levy v. Bowen, Medicare & Medicaid Guide
(CCH) 38,202 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 1989); Levy v. Sullivan, Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) 37,809 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 1989).
226. Few states now provide this important safeguard to residents who enroll in
HMOs. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 125/4-6 (West 1994).
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complex case.2 28 The agency hearing the appeal should be free
to consult a physician for additional medical expertise. 229 A
state might also allow the usual decisionmakers to refer a
complaint to a more appropriate governmental agency.23 ° Where
an enrollee is required first to exhaust a grievance procedure
within the HMO, a deadline should be imposed for the HMO's
decision and an expedited timetable should be established for
enrollees seeking urgent care. 231 Finally, HMOs should be
required to notify enrollees of their right to an administrative
appeal both upon enrollment and upon any denial of services.232
Effective notification is critical to administrative review be-
cause otherwise a patient may be likely to submit to an HMO's
decision in the mistaken belief that her only recourse is an
appeal to the same organization that initially denied her care.
Any mechanism a state provides should be subject only to
limited review in court.233 Judicial inquiries should be confined
to concerns about the arbitration or administrative appeal
process: Did the HMO or enrollee exert improper influence over
a "neutral" reviewing physician? Did the state panel deny a
228. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b)(4) (West Supp. 1996) (granting
state agency the discretion to "hold an informal meeting with the involved parties,
including providers who have joined in submitting the grievance or complaint, or who
are otherwise assisting or advocating on behalf of the subscriber or enrollee").
229. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 408.7056(1)(a) (Harrison 1995).
230. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b)(1)(C) (authorizing referral to
the California Department of Aging "or any other appropriate governmental entity").
231. See, e.g., id. § 1368(b)(1)(A) (requiring an enrollee to complete the HMO's
grievance process or to "participat[e] ... for at least 60 days" before initiating an
administrative appeal, but waiving this requirement in any case "involving an
imminent and serious threat to the health of the patient, including, but not limited
to, the potential loss of life, limb, or major bodily function").
232. See, e.g., id. § 1368(b)(3) (requiring notice to be "prominently display[ed] in
every plan contract, on enrollee and subscriber evidence of coverage forms, on the
complaint forms ... and on all written responses to grievances and complaints").
233. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at 1705-09. Professors Hall and
Anderson advocate significant procedural shortcuts:
An established reference point [for judicial review of arbitration decisions] is
readily found in the existing body of constitutional due process jurisprudence. ...
In the proceedings following termination or denial of disability income, Medicaid,
or Medicare benefits, the federal courts have held that it is constitutionally
sufficient to employ an inquisitorial rather than adversarial process, to consult
a physician retained by the agency who has not personally examined the patient,
to limit the patient's personal presentation of evidence to a documentary record
coupled with a toll-free phone line, to have different levels of review for different
amounts in controversy, and to preclude judicial review altogether.
Id. at 1706-07.
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party the right to present information to support its position?
Is the final outcome flatly inconsistent with the contract
language or all of the medical evidence? Limiting the scope of
review conserves judicial resources. It also helps eliminate the
unfair advantage an HMO has over an enrollee who is disin-
clined to sue,234 as well as the advantage enjoyed by the
enrollee who does sue in the trial court, a traditionally friendly
forum.235 In addition, this approach is more "oriented toward
the ex ante, insurance-purchasing perspective on the coverage
issues" 236 because limiting the scope ofjudicial review "place [s]
the courts in a mindset that is aware of the public policies in
favor of private, contractual remedies."237 In other words, a
court charged only with the limited task of procedural review
is probably less likely to rewrite the parties' agreement in light
of post-contract events, and more likely to focus on the HMO's
obligation, if any, to provide care under the terms of its bargain
with the enrollee.
A grievance process based on arbitration or administrative
review would also afford a more reasoned consideration of
relevant medical issues, because decisionmakers would hear
the opinions of impartial doctors instead of the slanted testi-
mony of opposing expert witnesses who may contradict each
other. This approach would lead to better-informed determi-
nations of whether a service is "medically necessary" in a
particular case, or whether a service is "experimental" or
"investigational 2 38 and therefore properly excluded under the
policy terms.
The latter determinations are especially dependent on
medical expertise because the line between proven "experi-
mental" or "investigational" medical practices is blurred, thus
creating a "twilight zone between promising and unproven
234. Cf supra note 163 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
236. Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at 1711.
237. Id. at 1710.
238. Generally, if the effectiveness of a treatment is widely doubted, the treatment
is considered "experimental." A treatment already shown to be beneficial in some
circumstances, but not others, is "investigational." See Hall & Anderson, supra note
164, at 1648 n.32. A typical policy excludes experimental care with language similar
to the following: "To be considered medically necessary a service or supply must
[be] .. . neither educational nor experimental in nature nor provided primarily for
research purposes." Id. at 1647 n.32 (quoting policy at issue in Dozsa v. Crum &
Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D.N.J. 1989)).
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treatments."239 For example, in the early years of treating
breast cancer through bone marrow transplants, the practice
was generally viewed as "experimental" because its effective-
ness was supported more by doctors' hunches than by conclu-
sive evidence. 240 The procedure improved as it evolved; as with
any treatment, greater experience led to safer and more
effective techniques. Further improvements are still possible,
but in light of the extensive research on the procedure few
insurers still deny coverage on the ground that the transplants
are experimental.24'
As once-experimental treatments become routine, new
treatments raise the same questions. For example, HMOs
sometimes balk at the practice of recommending a long-estab-
lished drug for uses other than those approved by the FDA.242
About half of all prescriptions in the U.S. are "off-label,"243 often
only because a pharmaceutical company has not bothered to
invest the time and money to obtain FDA approval for a new
use of a drug that has already been proven safe. 244 The practice
received little attention from HMOs until desperate doctors
began to prescribe expensive drugs in the hope that they might
help patients with AIDS and advanced cancers.245
Where no evidence exists to support an "off-label" prescrip-
tion, the HMO may deny the treatment as "investigational."246
Presumably, however, most prescribing physicians have at least
some valid reason to believe that an unconventional use of the
drug may be beneficial. 247 Thus, whether such a prescription
239. Larson, supra note 35, at 45 (quoting a physician's description of bone marrow
transplants for breast cancer patients); see Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at 1648
n.32 (describing the evolution of a new medical treatment).
240. See Larson, supra note 35, at 48 (discussing insurers' attitudes toward bone
marrow transplants).
241. See id. (estimating that three out of four insurers covered bone marrow
transplants in the treatment of breast cancer by 1990).
242. See Christine Gorman, Double-Duty Drugs, TIME, Sept. 18, 1995, at 96, 96
(describing this "shadowland of medical practice"). Prescribing medication to treat an
ailment for which it was not intended is known as 'off-label prescribing." See id. For
example, the nicotine patch may relieve intestinal inflammation, a cancer drug and
an ulcer drug may be combined to induce abortion, and Prozac is sometimes used to
treat obesity. See id. at 96-97.
243. Id. at 96 (citing the American Medical Association estimate).
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at n.32.
247. See generally Gorman, supra note 242 (discussing the widespread use of off-
label prescriptions).
FALL 1996]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:1
is covered depends on the sufficiency of the medical evidence.248
Yet, HMOs will allegedly label a procedure "experimental" or
"investigational" because of its high costs rather than its
unproven merit.249 Instead of the court relying on biased expert
testimony, a neutral physician, unaffiliated with either the
patient or the HMO is best qualified to synthesize clinical
studies and other evidence. Such physicians will be able to
detect pretextual excuses for denying care yet still allow HMOs
to refuse funding for treatments that scientific research has not
shown to be beneficial. An administative arbitration procedure
could provide for such analysis.
4. Repeal burdensome "mandated benefits," "any willing
provider," and "freedom of choice" laws-Legislation adopted
to effect the three reform principles above, while preventing
HMO abuses, may also result in increased operating costs for
HMOs. This effect may be partially offset by freeing HMOs
from the burdens of existing legislation that raises health care
costs while affording enrollees minimal protection. Lawmakers'
continuing focus on "mandated benefits," "any willing provider,"
and "freedom of choice" provisions has diverted attention from
measures that would better guarantee health benefits to the
seriously ill.25 ° The repeal of these measures would restore basic
cost-reducing elements of managed care. Moreover, by permit-
ting each HMO the freedom to customize the package of
benefits it offers and to select the providers from which its
enrollees may obtain care, lawmakers could facilitate greater
diversity in the health care marketplace.25 '
248. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at n.32.
249. One physician formerly employed by HMOs to conduct utilization reviews
confessed: "If there was any way at all to claim that something requested was
experimental or nonstandard, we took it. We looked for ways not to cover treatment."
Brink, supra note 163, at 70.
250. See Stephanie L. Stein, Challenge to H.M.O.'s Maternity Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 1996, § 13, at L.I. 9 (noting doctors' concern that the debate over a "mandated
benefits" provision requiring 48-hour hospital stays following childbirth "allows
politicians to take a popular stand while shirking the real problem of comprehen-
sive ... health care coverage"); cf Freeman L. Farrow, Note, Drive-Through Deliveries:
In Support of Federal Legislation to Mandate Insurer Coverage of Medically Sound
Minimum Lengths of Postpartum Stays for Mothers and Newborns, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1039 (1996) (supporting the recently enacted Newborns' and Mothers' Health
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874 (West, WESTLAW through
1996 2d Sess.)).
251. Greater diversity may not immediately result in more choices for HMO
enrollees whose HMOs are selected by their employers. Employers, however, are
increasingly responsive to employee concerns regarding HMO care. See Mahar, supra
note 2, at 29-30; Dolinsky & Caputo, supra note 75, at 25, 26. With greater
186
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The extensive "mandated benefits" initiatives enacted by most
state legislatures require all HMOs within the state to cover
a list of specific services, or to cover services generally supplied
by certain providers.252 A number of these initiatives may be
unnecessary because they ensure the provision of the type of
preventative, low-cost, and routine services that HMOs will
provide without a mandate in order to remain attractive to
enrollees .253
Lawmakers should be selective in choosing the benefits every
HMO must provide. For example, these laws are appropriate
for otherwise uninsurable risks that the legislature has reason
to spread among all HMO enrollees, or in cases where public
policy favors coverage to lessen the strain on social service
agencies. More frequently, appropriate "mandated benefits" are
those that the enrollee would not receive in the absence of
legislation, even though he desires such benefits and would
willingly pay higher premiums for it. The policy an enrollee
signs may not cover such treatments because it is an adhesion
contract, meaning that the enrollee and HMO do not actually
bargain over each provision. "Mandated benefits" laws prevent
HMOs from omitting certain desired coverages.
Problems arise, however, where "mandated benefits" laws
successfully create coverages for which the HMO and enrollee
would not otherwise have bargained. With each new "man-
dated benefits" provision, HMOs must either raise premiums
or cut expenses elsewhere.254 As premiums go up, enrollees
lose the cost benefits of subscribing to a managed care plan;
where an HMO holds down prices by cutting back on services,
patient care is compromised. Health care providers have
voiced concern that "less money can be spent on basic health
care as funds are rerouted to cover the mandates."255 The
alternative is perhaps more frightening: "mandated benefits"
coverage may threaten not only basic services but also expen-
sive but potentially lifesaving services. An HMO may conclude
that cuts in "basic" care will be apparent to enrollees, but that
differentiation between HMOs, more employers might be expected to allow employees
to select from among several competing HMOs.
252. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
253. See Gottlieb, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that "services like home care and
chiropractors" are factors potential enrollees use to distinguish HMOs that otherwise
appear similar).
254. See Carneal & Gallmetzer, supra note 95, at 286.
255. Id.
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the typical, relatively healthy enrollee will be unaware of the
HMO's questionable case-by-case denials of costly services for
the seriously ill.256 Either way, laws that force enrollees to
purchase benefits they do not want lessen enrollees' ability to
afford the coverage they do want.
"Mandated benefits" laws also create a powerful incentive for
businesses to cancel their HMO contracts and self-fund their
employee health plans instead.257 Employers selecting this
option pay for the care provided to employees themselves but
usually contract with insurers for claims processing and
administration.25 An insurer eager to fill this role will attempt
to hold down the employer's costs and may do so free of any
protections employees might have enjoyed previously under
state HMO law.
Other initiatives, known as "any willing provider" laws,
generally require an HMO to accept into its network any
provider willing to meet the HMO's terms.259 By broadening the
array of doctors an enrollee may choose, sponsors of these laws
hope to prevent HMOs from denying patients access to doctors
that are more generous in recommending patient care.26 ° If an
HMO, however, cannot hand-pick its providers, it must contract
with the worst available physicians as well as the best.261 The
effectiveness of these laws is questionable, because physicians
who most ardently oppose HMO cost-cutting measures are
probably least likely to join an HMO network even if the HMO
cannot keep them out. Finally, the Federal Trade Commission
has advised nine states that "any willing provider" laws "pose
a serious anti-competitive threat. 262 Responding to these
256. Of course, the protections against HMO misconduct proposed above in Part
IV.A.1-3 might aid in preventing such misconduct. In doing so, however, these
protections only will force an HMO squeezed by the costs of"mandated benefits" to
resort to price hikes or the reduction of "basic" services.
257. See Cohodes, supra note 56, at 84 (estimating that for more than a decade,
60% of businesses with more than 5000 employees have self-funded their employee
health plans).
258. See id.
259. See Carneal & Gallmetzer, supra note 95, at 282.
260. See Auerbach, supra note 68, at 15.
261. See HIRSH & WILCOX, supra note 8, at 39 (encouraging HMOs to eject incompe-
tent doctors and doctors who overtreat patients in their provider networks); Mahar,
supra note 2, at 34 (quoting the complaint of an employer's health care information
manager that "[miany plans will sign up just about any doctor in the state, which
means, by definition, that you don't get the highest quality").
262. Carneal & Gallmetzer, supra note 95, at 283. But see HIRSH & WILCOX, supra
note 8, at 48 (rejecting the concerns expressed by the Federal Trade Commission and
disapproving the Texas legislature's rejection of"any willing provider" laws in 1993).
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concerns, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(drafters of the HMO Model Act) and the National Governors
Association oppose such laws.263
Most importantly, lawmakers should reject "freedom of
choice" initiatives that allow HMO enrollees the opportunity
to obtain HMO coverage for care obtained outside the HMO's
provider network.264 These laws permit enrollees to circumvent
virtually all of the cost-containment mechanisms utilized by
HMOs to hold down the costs of medical care. An HMO unable
to limit patients to those physicians it has selected for their
cost-conscious practice styles or to control enrollees' access to
medical specialists cannot offer premiums substantially lower
than those in a traditional fee-for-service health insurance
plan.265
B. Democratizing HMO Regulation
Under the current regulatory scheme, HMOs too often deny
the care their enrollees want most. Most notably, enrollees
expect their HMOs to respect their own adherence to the Rule
of Rescue, and not stand idly by where serious harm or a death
might be prevented. If confronted with the question directly,
a prospective enrollee choosing between coverage options might
insist upon an HMO that will provide a bone marrow trans-
plant should he ever need one; he may be willing either to pay
a higher price for this coverage or to accept that other expen-
sive therapies will not be available. Such an exercise in medical
prioritizing requires an enrollee to exercise his judgment in a
way that is deeply personal and that may well depend on his
idiosyncratic preferences or knowledge of health risks. The
reform proposals above work together toward furthering
263. See Carneal & Gallmetzer, supra note 95, at 283.
264. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 4227 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring
employers who offer an HMO to offer the option of selecting alternative benefits
coverage as well).
265. Less ambitious "freedom of choice" statutes, such as those that merely allow
enrollees and plan providers to obtain prescription drugs and medical supplies from
any source, do not significantly affect either HMO costs or patient care. See, e.g., OR.
REV. STAT. § 441.084 (1995) (requiring that patients in a licensed health care facility
have a choice among prescription drug delivery systems); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4312.1
(Michie Supp. 1996) (ensuring the right of HMO subscribers to unlimited selection
of pharmacies).
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medical decisionmaking that is faithful to patient preferences.
Through these reforms, the law may more effectively compel
HMOs to deliver the services considered essential by their own
enrollees while leaving HMOs free to deny services that
enrollees regard as wasteful.
Ensuring that prospective enrollees may choose from different
health plans is an important first step toward health care
decisions based on patient preferences. First, a patient's most
basic medical judgments affect the number of dollars she is
willing to spend on health care. Some buyers of health coverage
may be willing and able to join an expensive plan covering any
service a physician recommends.266 Another health care con-
sumer, perhaps with less to spend on medical care and aware
that aggressive medical interventions often do more harm than
good,26 v may well conclude that "the best use of his insurance
dollar is to insure against only the least expensive acceptable
course of treatment."
268
Second, these basic judgments determine how a patient would
allocate her health care dollars to buy coverage against differ-
ent types of health risks. One enrollee might desire mostly to
avoid pain and illness during the healthiest years of her life,
figuring that no amount of coverage will provide tangible
benefits in, for example, the final stages of terminal cancer.
Another enrollee might take a different view, deciding that she
can pay minor health care expenses out-of-pocket, but that she
needs assurance that her health plan will cover any treatment,
even at high cost, that may someday help her cope with a
catastrophic illness.
If given the option, these two patients would surely join
different HMOs. To do so, prospective enrollees must be free
to contract for benefits they want while excluding others that
they determine are not worth their costs. "Mandated benefits"
laws restrict patient choice by preventing an enrollee from
selecting an HMO that will not charge for unwanted
coverages. 69 Other laws, however, are necessary if enrollees'
choices between HMOs are to be meaningful. In addition to the
disclosures now mandated by law, HMOs should be required
to reveal in marketing materials the financial incentives they
offer to providers and an explanation of how these incentives
266. Cf Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at 1682.
267. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
268. Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at 1682.
269. See supra Part IV.A.4.
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reward doctors who cut costs. 270 Armed with this information,
a prospective enrollee may choose an HMO whose practices are
consistent with his own notions of how health care dollars
should be allocated.
Of course, a patient's choice of HMO leaves more specific
questions unanswered. How should an HMO determine, for
example, whether its enrollees consider "essential" expensive
drug therapies that may extend the lives of people with cancer?
Once the cancer is detected, it is of course too late; a patient
who knows she is a candidate for these costly drugs cannot
possibly weigh the benefits of the medicines to her against the
costs to the HMO and the increased premiums that all enrollees
will have to pay. Because such a patient cannot fairly fix an
amount the HMO should pay for the care she needs, she cannot
rank this care against other services competing for the limited
resources of the HMO.
To circumvent this problem, enrollee preferences must be
determined at the time of enrollment with the HMO, before
health problems and the need for services arise. In Rawlsian
terms, patient priorities must be expressed from behind a "veil
of ignorance."271 From this position, enrollees "do not know how
the various alternatives will affect their own particular case."
272
Therefore, "they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the
basis of general considerations" 273 instead of on the basis of
what health care priorities will work to their advantage.
Unfortunately, no reliable method exists to ascertain a
patient's priorities as of the date of enrollment. One simply
cannot tell if a patient who enrolled in a top-of-the-line HMO
thought he was purchasing coverage for high-cost drug thera-
pies, for access to medical specialists, for any one of many
expensive coverages, or even if he gave the question any
thought at all. Researchers have found that despite sincere
efforts, people generally cannot place a dollar amount on the
value of reducing risks involving pain or death.
This phenomenon has been explored by Professor Thomas
Schelling,274 who explains that ordinarily there are two methods
270. See supra Part IV.A.2.
271. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
272. Id.
273. Id. at 137.
274. Professor Schelling observes that "avoidance of a particular death-the death
of a named individual-cannot be treated straightforwardly as a consumer choice. It
involves anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe, responsibility and religion." Thomas
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of determining whether the benefits of a consumer choice
exceed its costs. Of course, one can simply ask the consumer
what the benefit is worth.y Alternatively, one can observe his
selections from options available in the market.1
6
Neither approach is entirely satisfactory in the health care
purchasing context.2 77 Because "people are poor at answering
hypothetical questions, especially about important events ,278
buyers of health care are rarely able to articulate their feelings
about medical crises that may never arise. Nor can they predict
what their needs might be in a crisis in order to form entirely
rational purchasing decisions now; when considering possible
future dilemmas "the mood and motive of actual choice are hard
to simulate."279 These difficulties inevitably arise, Schelling
explains, when conceptualizing "a minute probability of an
awesome event."80 Thus, an enrollee's statements about which
health care services and outcomes he values most highly may
reveal more about the mood and circumstances under which
the statements were made than about his underlying values.281
For these reasons, while the information gleaned from a
patient's choice among health plans may reveal his general
stance toward high-cost medical care, it sheds little light on
whether he would have found any particular service to be worth
its costs. Because patients seem incapable of these types of
decisions, an alternative is needed.
The best choice is to place these judgments in the hands of
the primary-care physician.282 First, no potential decisionmaker
is better able to gain the patient-specific information needed
in order to make care decisions that reflect a patient's medical
priorities. Professor David Mechanic notes: "Patients vary
C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
ANALYSIS 127, 142 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968).
275. See id. at 142.
276. See id.
277. See BARRY R FURROW Er AL., THE HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FNANCE 326-27
(1991) (explaining that patients often cannot make rational health care purchasing
decisions, resulting in "demand distortions" in the market).
278. Schelling, supra note 274, at 143.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 144.
281. See id. at 142-46.
282. Cf Cohodes, supra note 56, at 102-03. Cohodes notes that managed-care
doctors "are asked to make trade-offs between treatment costs and benefits," and
concludes: "Physicians are ill-suited by training and inclination to undertake such
responsibilities. Nonetheless, they have been placed in a position where they must."
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enormously in their willingness and ability to withstand pain
and discomfort, to tolerate uncertainty, to fight to overcome
illness, and even to stay alive."28 3 Compared to other possible
health care decisionmakers, Professor Mechanic observes, a
patient's physician is "more likely to understand the complexity
of the patient's clinical condition, the social and familial
consequences of the illness, patient and family preferences for
conservative or aggressive care, and the value placed on
possible future outcomes."284
Proximity to their patients alone is not sufficient for a
physician to obtain this information; in addition, the doctor and
patient must have an ongoing relationship built on trust. A
patient may be unwilling to discuss candidly the above factors
with his physician if he knows that his physician may have the
final say in denying him care. Accordingly, patients should be
aware at all stages of treatment that they have practical
options to contest physicians' decisions both within and outside
the HMO.285 In addition, patients should be told of the financial
incentives offered to their physicians to avoid unfounded
suspicions about a physician's loyalties based on news reports
and fostered by an atmosphere of secrecy.
2 6
Of course, no physician will understand perfectly how each
of her patients perceives his own medical needs. However,
doctors are best situated to supplement what they do know
about each patient with an understanding of the needs patients
generally encounter when they face medical problems. In
contrast, HMO administrators generally lack recent clinical
287 lk aexperience, and, like lawmakers, are removed from the clin-
ical encounter.288
A primary care physician is also best positioned to make
decisions faithfully reflecting her patients' preferences because
she shares their goals for treatment. First, because of her
proximity to her patients, a physician is likely to empathize
with them, resisting modes of care that do not reflect enrollees'
wishes. Psychologists have demonstrated that decisionmakers
who are more removed from the subjects of their decisions are
283. Mechanic, supra note 92, at 1728.
284. Id. at 1727-28.
285. See supra Part IV.A.3.
286. See supra text accompanying note 213.
287. See Mechanic, supra note 92, at 1728.
288. Cf id.
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most willing to make decisions that will hurt them.28 9 Distant
decisionmakers are accordingly more likely to impose losses
that would be unacceptable to a patient, physician, or observer
who will witness the consequences firsthand. This principle
helps to explain why, when decisions are left to HMO adminis-
trators, HMOs sometimes exhibit a chilling disregard for
enrollees' most urgent medical needs.290 Physicians are more
inclined to heed the Rule of Rescue and to reject extreme cost-
cutting measures that will lead to an avoidable loss.
Naturally, if physicians' decisions are to emulate the choices
that would be made by a patient purchasing insurance-and
not a patient actually facing a crisis-the physician must also
have an opposing incentive to hold down costs. HMOs that offer
their physicians moderate incentives or adopt reasonable
withholding policies291 may provide physicians with a motive
to control costs that is roughly as powerful as a health care
buyer's incentive to keep premiums low. An HMO physician
should never be subject to incentives so coercive that they
exceed the enrollees' own desire to cut costs, such as a system
of pure capitation.2 92
Taking steps to align the interests of patient and physician
will help to ensure that HMOs provide the care patients most
want. Where feasible, HMO physicians would surely favor
coverage for the types of care denied by HMOs in the horror
stories. If a physician understands his patient's needs and is
not swayed by overpowering financial incentives, it is unlikely
that he would deny a breast cancer patient a necessary bone
marrow transplant 293 or insist that a prostate cancer patient
undergo surgery when effective medicines are available.294
At the same time, where the impact of the Rule of Rescue
must be limited, the clinical setting provides the best context
for doing so. One might imagine that however urgently a
patient about to undergo an internal X-ray may want his HMO
to provide the expensive fluid with a lower risk of unforeseen
complications, he would not have agreed upon enrollment to
pay his share of the billion-dollar annual cost as part of his
289. See id. at 1728 & n.59 (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE To AUTHORITY 32-43
(1969)).
290. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part IV.A.1.
292. See supra Part IV.A.1.
293. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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premium. Likewise, physicians in an HMO governed by the four
reform principles are likely to identify cases where the Rule of
Rescue would lead to costs that the public would view as
excessive.
This procedural approach is also the most palatable way to
limit the Rule of Rescue, because patients are most likely to
accept such decisions when they are made in the clinical
setting. Patients are understandably wary of broad, inflexible
edicts from health care administrators denying certain services
despite their potential to save lives but are less disturbed when
similar results are reached in case-by-case determinations
involving a familiar physician.295 Thus, professional judgment
is the tool best suited to the task of establishing rational
criteria for determining the limits of medical insurance cover-
age while simultaneously satisfying patients' basic desire for
insurance customized to their health needs.296
Patients must find allies in the health care system who will
serve as reliable stand-ins to advocate expensive but vital
services when appropriate and to explain HMOs' limited ability
to provide some services where a genuine limit exists. Because
in a managed care system patients have needs that are not
purely medical, physicians in HMOs must supply more than
medical expertise. They must also serve as "professional
decision makers, who not only diagnose but decide for the
consumer, because they decide with less pain, less regret, cooler
nerves, and a mind less flooded with alternating hopes and
fears."29 v With legal measures in place to ensure that treat-
ments selected by HMO enrollees and their physicians are both
effective and cost-effective, the HMO decisionmaking process
may be carried out "democratically, by letting the consumers
decide for themselves"29 where possible, and in other cases by
leaving detailed decisions to their physicians, whose preferences
most nearly mimic their own.
295. See Mechanic, supra note 92, at 1745 (observing that "in the clinical setting,
patients will be agreeable to physician decisions because they view them as medical
rather than political") (citing Thomas Halper, Who is the Odd Man Out? The
Experience of Western Europe in Containing the Costs of Health Care, 63 MILBANK
MEMORIAL FUND Q. 52, 73-78 (1985)).
296. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 164, at 1672.
297. Schelling, supra note 274, at 147.
298. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Frightened by "horror stories" about HMOs that refuse
expensive but vital services to their sickest enrollees, patients
no longer trust their HMOs to heed the Rule of Rescue and
make medical decisions that respect the sanctity of life. Yet
efforts to regulate HMOs have reinforced the routine, low-cost
health care at which most HMOs already excel, instead of
addressing patients' deepest concerns. State legislatures should
enact safeguards that will both preserve HMOs' defining cost-
reducing features and prevent HMOs from victimizing their
most vulnerable enrollees. Reform measures may abate the
concerns of anxious patients and restore their faith in managed'
care by improving the choices available in the health care
market, empowering patients to contest HMO decisions, and
placing more care decisions within the discretion of trusted
primary-care physicians.
